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Baby Doe, Congress and the States:
Challenging the Federal Treatment
Standard for Impaired Infants
Stephen A. Newman*

In its amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act,
Congress set forth a strict standard for treatment of impaired infants. The
statute, shaped by right-to-life groups and certain medical organizations,
calls for aggressive treatment in virtually all cases, regardless of the degree
of suffering imposed and the burdens and risks involved. The federal rule
evidences deep distrust of parental decisionmaking, relegating most parents
to a nonparticipatory bystander role.
Congress did not make its rule binding on the states. Rather, it conditioned the receipt of federal funds upon incorporation of the rule into each
state's law. Most states have accepted the condition, largely through
rulemaking by state child abuse agencies.
This article challenges the authority of state administrators to promulgate these rules, and argues that state constitutions, little mentioned in the
Baby Doe debate thus far, may prohibit many states from adopting the federal standard. Ordering medical interventions that perpetuate extreme conditions of physical and mental devastation, subjecting infants to grave
suffering for uncertain benefits, and depriving parents of virtually all decisionmaking power violates the norm of governments constitutionally committed to individual liberty, human dignity and family autonomy. A
constitutionally sound approach to this issue would permit careful, ethical
deliberation, attention to the individual circumstances of each infant Doe
and a reasonable degree of parental control.
[S]urely, the interpreter of last resort in this particular ordeal
is the conscience of suffering parents wracked by the suffering
of their child. Into their private chamber of personal agony
and decision, only the most presumptuous among us would
dare to tread.'
One of the most curious pieces of legislation ever passed by the
* Professor of Law, New York Law School

'CBS Evening News With Dan Rather 13 (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 10, 1983)(editorial
commentary by Bill Moyers)(transcript on file at CBS, Inc.).
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U.S. Congress purports to resolve the tragic medical, legal and ethical
dilemmas posed by the birth of severely impaired infants. The amend2
ments to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA),
strongly influenced by the right-to-life philosophy, 3 set a norm for aggressive, even relentless, treatment, with little regard for the suffering
and grave burdens such aggressive care may generate. The few exceptions to mandatory maximal treatment are narrowly drawn, virtually
eliminating parental decisionmaking discretion.4
Yet Congress, despite the passage of such a strongly worded standard, significantly blunted its potential impact in two ways. First, it deprived the United States Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), the agency most likely to enforce the new statute vigorously, of
all direct enforcement authority.5 Second, Congress did not make the
rule binding upon the states. Instead, the federal infant Doe rule is
merely a condition attached to a minor federal grant program, in which
state participation is voluntary.6 The CAPTA program makes funds
available to states for their child abuse and neglect agencies. Funding
levels for CAPTA have been extremely low, providing a meager monetary incentive to the states to comply with the federal infant Doe provision. States are given the choice of applying for CAPTA money and
conforming their laws to the federal infant Doe standard, or making
their own infant Doe law and forfeiting the relatively small amount of
CAPTA funds.
Thus the federal law, far from finally resolving the complex infant
Doe treatment issue, leaves the matter where it originally rested, in the
hands of the states. A carrot is offered to those states adopting the
strict federal rule, but no state is obligated to accept it. To date, from
the point of view of those supporting the federal rule, the response of
the states has been positive. Some states have legislated a standard imitative of the federal rule.7 Many others have responded by administrative rulemaking; the state agencies who stand to gain from CAPTA
grants have adopted the federal rule as their own, claiming the power
to do so under state child abuse and neglect laws.' Despite the appear242 U.S.C. §§ 5101-05 (1984).
3 Right to life groups played a major role in negotiations leading to the enactment of the

statute. For an account of the negotiations from the right to life perspective, see Gerry &
Nimz, The FederalRole in Protecting Babies Doe, 2 IssuEs L. & MED. 339 (1987).
4 Id. at 349.

5 ld. at 354.
6

Id.
7 See, e.g., 17 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015 (10)(e) (Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3102 (Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101 (West 1987).

8 See, e.g., Neglect and Dependency, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015 § 2(a)(5) (West 1989);
Reporting of Maltreatment of Minors, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 § 2(c) and 10(c) .(West
1989); Definitions for Alleged Withholding of Appropriate Nutrition, Hydration, Medication,
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ance of satisfaction with the federal infant Doe rule, I suggest that a
new round of controversy and sharp legal debate lies ahead. This is so
because: (1) the assumption of rulemaking authority by state child protective agencies raises serious questions about the legitimacy of that
authority; (2) the adoption of the federal infant Doe rule by states raises
serious questions of state constitutional law; and .(3) many state policy
makers not heard from in the debate thus far may be less receptive to
the right-to-life philosophy than the federal government was in the
middle years of the Reagan Administration. Indeed, a social consensus
may be building - or already exist - for the view that infants already
facing the hard reality of an injury-ridden existence need not suffer the
additional burdens imposed by the federal rule.9
I.

THE FEDERAL STATUTE

The federal infant Doe rule, contained in the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, asks the states to prohibit the withholding of medically
indicated treatment from a disabled infant with a life-threatening condition. The key provision states:
the term "withholding of medically indicated treatment"
means the failure to respond to the infant's life-threatening
conditions by providing treatment (including appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medication) which, in the treating physician's or physicians' reasonable medical judgment, will be
most likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all
such conditions, except that the term does not include the failure to provide treatment (other than appropriate nutrition, hydration, or medication) to an infant when, in the treating
physician's or physicians' reasonable medical judgment, (A)
the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose; (B) the provision of such treatment would (i) merely prolong dying, (ii)
not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's
life-threatening conditions, or (iii) otherwise be futile in terms
of the survival of the infant; or (C) the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of the
infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances
or Medically Indicated Treatment from Disabled Infants with Life-Threatening Conditions,
OHIO. ADMIN. CODE §§ 5101:2-35-76, 5101:2-35-77 (1985). investigation of Reports of Suspected Medical Neglect of Handicapped Infants Including Instanctes of Withholding of Medically Indicated Treatment for Disabled Inhnts with lilt'-ltreatening Conditions, Circular
Letter No. SSA 86-3 (1985)(issued by the Md. Dp't of Ilumn Resources); Wyo. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & SOCIAL SERVICES, PROCEDURESIOR
REISONIIN(: 1O REPORTS OF WITHHOLDING
MEDICALLY INDICATED TREATMENT FROM I)INAIBI.ED INIANIS WITi
TIONS,
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9 See infra text accompanying note 26.

(1987).

LIFE-THREATENING CONDI-
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would be inhumane.' 0
A violation of this rule would constitute "medical neglect" of the infant,
calling for appropriate intervention by state child abuse authorities."
The extent to which treatment is made compulsory by the federal
rule is astonishing. Even where treatment would be inhumane, that by
itself is insufficient reason to stop treating; exception (C) requires that
treatment be inhumane and have virtually no chance of saving the life of
the infant. A slim chance of survival apparently justifies inhumane
treatment as does some chance of a survival wracked by excruciating
pain, severe abnormalities and a torturous regime of medical interventions. HHS has even gone on record with the suggestion that under the
statute, infants suffering from Tay-Sachs disease plus a life-threatening
intestinal blockage, must undergo intestinal surgery.' 2 The surgery
would repair the blockage, enabling such infants to live for perhaps a
year or two until the inevitable, prolonged and agonizing death of TaySachs ends their lives. Such a compulsory treatment requirement for
the infant with Tay-Sachs, commented the Yale University School of
Medicine, "should be viewed, and would be viewed by medical opinion
and loving parents, as an act of abuse and inhumanity."'"
At the same time as it mandates extraordinarily aggressive care, the
statute exhorts doctors to use "reasonable medical judgment." This
judgment is limited, however, to applying the terms of the statute to
individual infants. The physician is not free to allow considerations of
suffering, medical ethics and burdens of treatment to enter into his
1042 U.S.C. § 5102 (1984).
1142 U.S.C. § 5103 (1984).
1249 Fed. Reg. 48,164 (1984)(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340)(proposed Dec. 10,
1984). Although the HHS did not include this and other examples in its final rules, it did not
disavow its extreme views. Rather, it explained that its examples of specific diagnoses were
deleted to "avoid the essential thrust of the interpretive guidelines being lost amidst uncertainty regarding how the addition or subtraction of particular complications or medical nuances might affect the examples." 50 Fed. Reg. 14,880 (1985)(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.
1340).
13YALE UNIV. SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES PROPOSED REGULATIONS ON THE CARE OF HANDICAPPED INFANTS 4 (Jan. 25,
1985)(available at Yale Univ. School of Medicine, Dep't of Pediatrics).
Professor Nancy Rhoden describes Tay Sachs disease as follows:
Tay-Sachs is an inherited metabolic disorder found predominantly in persons of AshkenazicJewish descent. A Tay-Sachs baby may appear normal at birth, but within a
few months develop some degree of motor weakness. As muscle tone deteriorates,
Tay-Sachs infants will develop difficulty in swallowing, followed by increasing paralysis, spasticity, deafness, blindness, and convulsions. By age two or three, they become virtually vegetative, and they die by age four or five. Because these infants will
get recurrent infections, treatment decisions may involve artificial respiration, resuscitation, or aggressive use of antibiotics.
Rhoden, Treatm wt Dilemmasfor Imperiled Newborns: Why Quality of Life
Counts, 58 S.CAL. L. REV.
1283, 1292 (1985).
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"reasonable medical judgment."' 4 Clinical decisionmaking for all patients can hardly disregard such matters, and we should be appalled at
any medical education that taught its students to do so. Yet such is the
teaching of this statute.
Not even mentioned in the statute are the people who are legally,
socially and morally responsible for the infant's welfare - its parents.
Reading the statute, one may easily forget that parents normally decide
upon medical care for children. Their informed consent is required by
law. Both law and society regard parents as the primary protectors of
their child's best interests.' 5 Under this statute, however, loving, conscientious parents, as well as uncaring, neglectful ones, are deprived of
decisionmaking rights as the state assumes the traditional parental role
of making critical choices for the child with the medical guidance of a
physician. Indeed, underlying the statute seems to be a view of parents
as suspect bystanders, presumptively ready to commit child abuse by
depriving their infants of necessary medical care.
Another striking feature of the statute is its preference for state
rather than federal enforcement. Two years prior to the statute's enactment, President Reagan personally directed the HHS to monitor the
treatment of handicapped newborns.' 6 The HHS responded with regulations, purportedly authorized by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, requiring hospitals to post notices in hospital nurseries
warning parents, doctors and nurses that the babies in their care were
under the protection of the federal government. The notices contained
a 24-hour telephone hotline number available for reporting suspicious
physician behavior.' 7 Ready to respond to the calls were federally organized "Baby Doe squads" that visited reported hospitals, investigated treatment plans and interrogated health care providers, generally
disrupting hospital routines and infant care, in the process.' 8 Getting
4

Id. at 1297.

15 See generally id. at 1283.

16 S. REP. No. 246, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2918, 2922. The Secretary of the HHS promptly notified hospitals not to withhold medical or surgical treatment or nutrition from handicapped newborns, and suggested
that if parents refused to consent to any treatments the hospital should evict the newborn
from its facilities. 47 Fed. Reg. 26,027 (1982).
17 48 Fed. Reg. 9631 (1983); 45 C.F. R. § 84.61 (1985). The key provisions of the regulations were invalidated by the Supreme Court in Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610
(1986). A valuable account of the medical, social and political developments surrounding the
infant Doe rules is found in Reiser, Survival At What Cost? Origins and Effects of the Modern Controversy on Treating Severely HandicappedNewborns, 11 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 199, 199-212
(1986).
18 Strain, The American Academy of Pediatrics Comments on the "Baby Doe II'" Regulations, 309
NEw ENG. J. MED. 443 (1983). One of the six Senate sponsors of the statute said she was
deeply troubled by the aggressive actions of the HHS. 130 CONG. REC. S9321 (daily ed. July
26, 1984)(statement of Sen. Kassebaum).
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this extraordinarily intrusive federal agency out of the hospital nursery
was no doubt a high priority for the medical profession, and the statute
gives the HHS no direct role in enforcing the medical care rules established by the law.' 9 Turning away from the enthused, zealous HHS
enforcers, the law selects the understaffed, often overwhelmed personnel of state and local child abuse agencies to carry out its mandate.
Given declining federal monetary assistance 20 and high case loads involving more and more serious physical injuries, incest, rape and other
forms of sexual abuse, it is doubtful the Congress could have seriously
contemplated any significant diversion of state personnel and resources
to infant Doe enforcement efforts.
Compounding the doubt about the strength of Congressional dedication to the bill is the fact that it is not mandatory upon the states; by
giving up the miniscule funding provided by Congress in the Act, any
state is free to disregard the infant Doe rules. The funds specifically
earmarked for the massive, ever-increasing problem of child abuse and
neglect are worth a closer look. The total outlay for the entire nation in
fiscal year 1987 was only $9 million. 2 1 Basic state grants ranged from
$45,000 to $680,000. The median amount was $152,000. For a problem on which large states annually spend hundreds of millions of dollars, the CAPTA grant program is a sparse one, providing only a tiny
fraction of a state's general child abuse budget. Three states - California, Pennsylvania and Indiana - with expensive child abuse efforts do
not even bother to participate in the CAPTA grant program.22
Congressional supporters of the Baby Doe bill cited a "consensus"
reached on the law by various groups. There were a number of groups
19 The HHS, limited to promulgating rules concerning state grant qualifications under
the funding program of which the infant Doe rule is a part, took advantage of the opportunity
left to it to issue its own "interpretations" of the law, attempting to narrow the treatment
exceptions even further. Adverse criticism, including some from the Congressional sponsors
of the law, caused the HHS to retreat from some but by no means all of its interpretive positions. See 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878, 14,879-80, 14,889 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 13 40)(appendix of non-binding "interpretative guidelines").
20
See HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, ABUSED CHILDREN IN
AMERICA: VICTIMS OF OFFICIAL NEGLECT, H.R. Doc. No. 260, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 43
(1987)[hereinafter ABUSED CHILDREN IN AMERICA].
21 Other federal grant programs, such as Title XX of the Social Services Block Grants and
Titles IVB and IVE of the Social Security Act, may distribute considerably greater sums.
ABUSED CHILDREN IN AMERICA, supra note 20, at 43-44. None of these other federal grant
programs requires states to adopt the federal Baby Doe rule.
22 State by state allocations for F.Y. 1987 are available from the National Center on Child
Abuse and Neglect in Washington, D.C. The House Select Committee Report noted that in
F.Y. 1985, a number of states, including California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New .jersey.
Pennsylvania and Texas, spent over $100 million on child abuse programs. ABUSED CILDREN
IN AMERICA, supra note 20, at 64-65. Figures for the three states not participating in the
CAPTA grant program: Pennsylvania spent $245,431,035 in F.Y. 1985 (measured in constant
1982 dollars); California spent $480,603,448; and Indiana spenl $46,288,642. Id.

BABY DOE, CONGRESS AND THE STATES

that negotiated with each other and with Congressional staffers to produce a bill acceptable to each of them. The negotiations were essentially between right-to-life and disability groups, on the one side, and
professional medical organizations on the other.2" The medical community did not reach a consensus supporting the bill. While a number
of professional groups did agree to the negotiated compromise, the nation's largest medical organization, the American Medical Association
(AMA), did not. 24 Perhaps most significantly, the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC), representing 127 medical schools, over
80 academic societies, and more than 350 teaching hospitals (where
care for the majority of incapacitated infants in the nation takes place),
voiced strong opposition to the law and to proposed HHS regulations
25
under it.

Recent polls of both physicians and the general public further indicate that the claimed "consensus" supporting the infant Doe statute
does not in fact exist. For example, a 1987 Louis Harris & Associates
poll asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: (1) "Doctors should do everything in their power to
preserve the life of a newborn baby even if it is very seriously deformed
23

See infra note 201.
24 See American Med. Ass'n, Statement to the Dep't of Health and Human Services 7
(Feb. 8, 1985)("In summary, the AMA objects to the approach taken by the Child Abuse
Amendments of 1984 because they interfere with familial autonomy; they impose inferior governmental judgments regarding the degree of discretionary treatment for seriously ill
newborns; and they rely on imprecise and ambiguous language." The AMA also found the
HHS proposed regulations improperly incorporated "a bias toward reducing parental autonomy to the greatest degree possible").
25 In a letter to the HHS Secretary Margaret Heckler, the AAMC explained its opposition
to the legislation:
The chief reason the AAMC and others refused to sign onto this compromise agreement was its failure to recognize that many severely ill newborns cannot be classified
into the categories of those who will live or those who will die. These infants often
have devastating neurological conditions which are so grave that they will preclude
the infant from ever functioning as an independent human being; they may not be
able to experience even the most fundamental human functions, such as recognizing
their parents. Commonly, they have other medical conditions that require treatment
if they are to survive. In making decisions about these infants, it is necessary to take
into account the extent of neurological damage and the severity of the other diagnoses, the full range of treatment possibilities, and the risks associated with each.
There are no quick or easy answers; there is no formula applicable to every infant
with the same general diagnoses. A decision about each child must be made by the
concerned parents and family and the physicians who have first hand knowledge
about the condition of the child in question .... The difficult decisions occur when
medical care is not clearly beneficial because it can reverse only certain aspects of the
infant's condition, but cannot correct or reverse the underlying disease or the permanent brain damage. Resolving this dilemma is even more difficult when the treatment carries with it the significant possibility of terrible complications.
Letter from Dr. John A. D. Cooper, President of the Association of American Medical Colleges to the Hon. Margaret Heckler (Feb. 7, 1985)(available from the Association of American
Medical Colleges, Washington, D.C.).
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and will never be able to live a normal life." Of 1,250 adults nationwide, 50% agreed with the statement, 45% disagreed, and 5% were not
sure; of 200 physicians, 26% agreed, 69% disagreed, and 6% were not
sure. (2) "If a child is born with very serious brain damage and will
never have a normal life, its parents should be able to ask the doctor
not to take any special steps, such as major surgery, to keep it alive."
Of 1,250 adults, 70% agreed, 27% disagreed, and 3% were 'not sure.
Of 200 physicians, 95% agreed, 5% disagreed and 1% were not sure.
A 1985 Associated Press/Media General poll asked a question similar
to the second question in the Harris poll: "In general when a severely
retarded infant is born with other defects that will kill that child without
surgery, do you think the baby's parents should or should not be allowed to order surgery withheld?" Of 1,532 adults nationwide, 61%
said parents should be allowed to do this, 22% said they should not,
26
and 17% were not sure.
Questionnaires answered by 494 neonatologists around the nation
revealed that 60% of these doctors thought the infant Doe statute did
not allow adequate consideration of an infant's suffering; only 5% believed that the rules would result in improved care to all infants.2 7 In
considering three hypothetical cases posed by the survey, many of the
physicians felt there was a conflict between the rule's mandates and
their duty to act in infants' best interests. Most felt the current federal
rule was a mistake, encouraging or requiring overtreatment of
infants.28

Further evidence that the federal statute does not represent a consensus comes from the fact that a distinguished commission, 29 appointed by the president to study the thorny issues presented by
modern biomedical advances, made recommendations on this issue
that differ markedly from the terms of the statute. The commission,
discussing cases in the difficult "gray areas" of decisionmaking, recognized the virtues of both parental decisionmaking and a best interests
30
test that considers and weighs the benefits and burdens of treatment.
The commission's restrained approach, recognizing the agonies of
decisionmaking, and respectful of the loving and conscientious concern
26 Polling data available from The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research in Storrs,
Connecticut. For additional data on the public's views concerning medical life support, see
discussion and citations in In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434, 446 n.l I (N.J. 1987).
27 Kopelman, Irons & Kopelman, NeonatologistsJudge the "Baby Doe" Regulations, 318 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 677, 679 (1988).
28 Id.
29 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL

AND

BEHAVIORAL

RESEARCH,

DECIDING

(1983)[hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N].

30d. at 214-18.

TO

FOREGO

LIFE-SUSTAINING

TREATMENT
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of parents, is a far cry from the treatment demands insisted upon by the
federal statute.
Other signs of dissension exist. The nation's most populous state,
California, which stood to gain the most from CAPTA funding,
dropped out of the grant program due to the infant Doe eligibility condition. A bill to conform California law to comply with the federal statute was introduced into the state legislature in 1987, but it was killed in
committee. 3 ' Eleven state child protective agencies, responding to a
survey by the HHS, stated that because of the medical and ethical issues
involved, their responsibility for infant Doe cases was not appropriate. 32 Despite the generally positive HHS report on the federal law, its
own Inspector General conceded: "[i]t is not clear what impact the
Federal legislation and increased State responsibility have had on the
33
incidence or handling of baby Doe reports."
II.

AGENCY RULEMAKING AUTHORITY

A.

THE IMPROPER ASSUMPTION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS

State child protective agencies charged with the goal of pursuing
instances of child abuse and neglect have sometimes assumed the authority to promulgate regulations and to make policy decisions that determine when treatments may be withheld from handicapped
newborns. Is the exercise of such authority legitimate? A quick look at
the matter might suggest a positive answer, because state statutes often
use broad terms to define neglect 4 and delegate broad enforcement
power to the relevant state agencies. 3 5 But the matter is more complex
than it first appears.
Legislatures, it is true, routinely delegate broad responsibilities to
state agencies. But agencies may not use their delegated power to
perform legislative functions. As the New York Court of Appeals recently phrased the issue in Boreali v. Axelrod:3 6 "[W]e must . . . inquire
whether, assuming the propriety of the Legislature's grant of authority,
the agency exceeded the permissible scope of its mandate by using it as
a basis for engaging in inherently legislative activities." 3 7 There is, in
31S. 1596, Cal. Leg. (1987)(available from the office of California Sen. Joseph B.
Montoya).
32 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SURVEY
OF STATE BABY DOE PROGRAMS 11 (1987).
33

Id. at 13.

34 New York's Family Court Act speaks of the failure to provide "adequate" medical care.
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(f) (Consol. 1987).
35 See, e.g., 12A Mo. ANN. STAT. § 199-210.110(5) (Vernon 1987)(discusses tuberculosis
sanatoriums); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAw § 34, 424 (Consol. 1987).
36 71 N.Y.2d 1, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 523 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1987).
37
1d. at 9, 517 N.E.2d at 1353, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
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the court's words, a "difficult-to-define line between administrative
rulemaking and legislative policy-making." 3 8 In Boreali, a public health
agency had issued anti-smoking regulations under a broad statute empowering it to "deal with any matters affecting the... public health." 3 9
Noting that the state judiciary had long approved very broad delegations of power by the legislature in many other areas, the court deemed
the general grant of authority to the Public Health Council an appropriate means to safeguard the public health. But the action of the agency
in promulgating anti-smoking rules, purportedly under this authority,
was deemed an encroachment into the legislative domain, in violation
of the state constitutional separation-of-powers principle. "Striking the
proper balance among health concerns, cost and privacy interests," the
court decided, "is a uniquely legislative function." 4 ° The court found
that the agency had assumed the power to resolve a difficult, muchdebated social problem, without any legislative policy to guide it. It
had done so in an area where the legislature had itself failed to act despite the substantial public debate on the issue and the introduction,
but not passage, of bills addressing the issue.4 '
Of course, the problem of treatment or nontreatment decisions for
infants differs in many ways from the issue of smoking in public places.
But several features of the treatment refusal issue raise identical concerns about the propriety of solving infant Doe dilemmas through administrative rulemaking. Like the smoking issue, treatment dilemmas
represent a controversy that has recently come to the forefront of public debate. Also like the smoking issue, the problem involves the balancing of ethical, social, medical, economic and privacy concerns.
Infant Doe treatment dilemmas obviously implicate competing moral
and social values, and touch upon sensitive family and infant privacy
interests. Any solution will affect the physician/family relationship and
the professional practice of modern medicine. Economic concerns are
also present. Neonatal intensive care is enormously expensive, 42 both
to families and to states that pay substantial sums for newborn care
through public health insurance programs. In an era of rising health
costs, compulsory neonatal treatment rules of questionable worth impose economic obligations that legislatures setting limits on state
health care budgets may not necessarily choose to incur. As many have
pointed out,4 3 funds to help handicapped newborns may be better
38Id. at 11,517 N.E.2d at 1355, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
39 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 225(5)(2) (Consol. 1987).
40
Boreali, 71 N.Y.2d at 12, 517 N.E.2d at 1355, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
41 Id.
0
42 Kirkley, Fetal Survival-What P nce?, 137 AM. J. OBsT. & GYN. 873 (1980).
43 See, e.g., Young, Caringfor Disabled Infants, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1983, at 15;

Lantos, Baby Doe Five Years Later, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 444 (1987); Stevenson, Ariagno, Kut-
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spent in prenatal programs that prevent birth defects and in long term
programs that provide better institutional care, nursing, physical therapy and other services desperately needed by handicapped children.
States considering mandatory care must also consider the economic
question raised when hospitals with intensive care nurseries refuse admittance to those who cannot afford to pay. Will the state allocate
funds to provide the mandated treatment for the uninsured and the
inadequately insured?
It is reasonable to conclude that the resolution of such difficult societal problems, implicating so many competing interests, is not a function for an administrator. This is especially so when the administrator
lacks any guidance from the state legislature on the issue, as is the case
in most of the states on the infant Doe issue." Traditional child abuse
and neglect statutes certainly do not focus on the complex questions of
care for severely birth defective newborns. Administrators relying on
these statutes for infant Doe rulemaking powers are entirely on their
own, without legislative instruction or direction on the basic policy
questions involved. They are in reality making new law, not merely carrying out the legislative mandate entrusted to them.
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that a number of legislatures and governors have created task forces to advise them on the
range of bioethical issues arising from recent advances in medical technology, including the treatment of handicapped newborns.4 5 When the
legislature or the governor is actively searching for public policy recommendations on a new and unprecedented social issue, the matter
can not properly be foreclosed by an administrative agency independently deciding on a new legal direction. A judicial opinion handed
down when the HHS attempted to make binding rules for the treatment
of infant Does further supports the view that this area calls for legislaner, Raffin & Young, The 'Baby Doe' Rule, 255J. A.M.A. 1909, 1911 (1986). Other programs,
like universal prenatal care, compete for limited funding and may be more effective than afterthe-fact intensive care in reducing the number and severity of birth defects. Lantos, supra, at
446-47. Such programs are also cost-effective. 5400 Births That Cost S400,000, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 22, 1988, (Editorial), at A18, col. I. Furthermore, strong moral arguments have been
made that government must first provide better care and facilities for children who survive
with severe mental and physical incapacities; to compel treatment without providing for basic
post-treatment needs is "patently hypocritical." J. LYoNs, PLAYING GOD IN THE NURSERY 263
(1985); see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 29, at 228-29. For further discussion of this

point, see infra notes 212-19 and accompanying text.
44 See statutes cited supra note 7.
45 See, e.g., N.Y. Task Force on Life and the Law; N.J. Comm'n on Legal and Ethical
Problems in the Delivery of Health Care. A former Solicitor General of New York writes that
"legislative inaction on issues of consequence and controversy must be considered, in a very
meaningful sense, to be governmental action. And if it is to provide a rationale for any posture by an administrative agency, that posture, the courts are saying, should be a respectful
repose." Hermann, What Is Going On Here?, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 18, 1988, at 2, col. 4.
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tive, not administrative, action. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, considering an early attempt by the HHS to promulgate
Baby Doe regulations, declared that "[I]t is congress, rather than an
executive agency, that must weigh the competing interests at stake in
46
this context in the first instance."
State agencies may attempt to legitimate their rulemaking by pointing to the existence of the federal infant Doe statute, but this will not
suffice. The federal law is not binding on the states; it does not dictate
what state law must be, but merely offers modest funding to states that
conform their laws to the federal model. States must still determine
for themselves what their law will be and how far the rulemaking power
of state agencies extends in making that law. This is a vital matter because each state has a critical interest in preserving the integrity of its
own lawmaking structure. The federal law cannot resolve this issue for
any state. Rather, each state must address the difficulties suggested
here concerning proper limits on the power of the state's own administrative bodies.
Indeed, the federal law, rather than legitimating state agency
rulemaking, provides another reason to be wary of it. Because the federal law establishes its infant Doe rule as a condition of a grant program
providing funds to state child protective agencies, these agencies have a
direct financial interest at stake in promulgating the rule precisely as
dictated by the federal funders. To enhance its own budget, a state
agency may be less reliable in carefully considering and weighing all
competing interests. Courts may justifiably be suspicious of agency
claims to rulemaking powers that simultaneously enlarge both agency
jurisdiction and the agency budget.4 7
In the first instance, it is the state legislature or judiciary that must
determine the state's infant Doe policy. Lawmakers and judges must
decide: (1) whether the federal infant Doe rule is in harmony with the
state's own beliefs, traditions and public philosophy; (2) whether trends
in the state's medical, legal and popular thought may be moving away
from the federally preferred solution; and (3) whether state constitutional mandates conflict with the federal proposal. As the Arizona
Supreme Court wrote in 1987, treatment refusal issues are "fraught
with moral, ethical, social, medical, and legal considerations ....
the Legislature [can] . . . synthesize the vast . . . information .

Only

.. [and
weigh] the rights and interests of the many individuals and institutions

46

United States v. University Hosp., State Univ. N.Y. at Stonybrook, 729 F.2d 144, 161

(2d Cir. 1984).
47 Cf. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 572 F. Supp. 1298, 1299
(E.D.N.Y. 1983)(distorting effect of budgetary pressures on sound professional judgment).
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involved in these tragic situations."'4 8
B.

IMPROPER ASSERTION OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY

Agency rulemaking is also challengeable on a related but legally
distinct ground. The assertion of authority, under child abuse and neglect statutes, over infant Doe decisionmaking poses a classic issue of
statutory interpretation; does the typical child abuse and neglect statute
contemplate coverage of treatment decisions for seriously ill infants?
Typically, state statutes prohibit "medical neglect" but do not define
the term beyond a somewhat vague reference to parental failure to provide adequate medical care to a child.4 9 Under such a statute, an
agency might assert its freedom to define neglect in virtually any fashion it sees fit in order to adjust to the many different ways in which
children are deprived by the neglectful behaviors of their caretakers.
Thus, if the agency chooses to regulate treatment decisions for impaired infants, it could claim it is merely interpreting the meaning of
neglect in a medical context.
Examining the matter more closely, it appears that certain important shared understandings inform the common legal usage of the term
"neglect." Primary is the notion of a fundamental disregardfor a child's
needs. The neglectful parent ignores basic needs of his child, hence
harm results from and is attributable to the parent's heedless, uncaring
behavior. In the context of medical neglect, the behavior is usually the
failure to seek competent medical attention when serious medical
problems exist.5"
Compare this common understanding of neglect with the scenario
surrounding an infant Doe treatment decision. The parents, far from
disregarding their child's interests, focus intensely on them. They contemplate their child's suffering, precarious state of health and potential
future life. Trusted family, friends, religious advisers and others are
consulted, for wisdom, solace and support. Harm to the child, or
death, constitutes a grievous, painful loss, almost beyond comprehension. Instead of thoughtless and uncaring behavior, there is profound
concern, empathy and love. The burden of responsibility is not carelessly evaded or casually assumed; it is borne, in all its tragic dimension,
with anguished dignity. Medical attention, far from lacking, appears in
48

Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 225, 741 P.2d 674, 692 (1987)(opinion by

Gordon, ChiefJ.)[hereinafter Rasmussen II]; see Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 200, 741 P.2d
667 (1987)(opinion by Howard, J.)[hereinafter Rasmussen I].
49 See supra note 34.
50
See, e.g., In re Ray, 95 Misc. 2d 1026, 408 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Fam. Ct. 1978). Parents may
not use their own religious beliefs to deny needed medical care for their child. See, e.g., In re
Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425 (Tenn. App. 1983); In re Gregory S., 85 Misc. 2d 846, 380
N.Y.S.2d 620 (Fam. Ct. 1976).
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its most modern technological dress. Parents and physicians, confronting the suffering caused by some of the most devastating conditions known to medicine, may view aggressive care as inappropriate
and even inhumane. Can their rejection of aggressive care rationally be
deemed "neglect" when it proceeds from a profound concern on the
part of loving parents, rests on sound medical advice and is founded
upon reasoned judgment about what is best for the child?
The disparity between this scenario and the common understanding of neglect is so vast that the latter cannot reasonably be said to
subsume the former. Traditionally, child abuse and neglect law is concerned with the universally condemned vices of those who act callously
toward children. Such laws exist in every state, testament to their root
in society-wide agreement. It seems beyond rational dispute that they
were never meant to deal with the medically complex and morally ambiguous problems of bioethics, morality and law posed by the infant
Doe dilemma. 5 '
Further support for this conclusion may be found in certain judicial
and legislative actions that clarify the scope of neglect laws in some
states. California, for example, amended its definition of neglect in
1987 to include the statement that: "[A]n informed and appropriate
medical decision made by parent or guardian after consultation with a
physician or physicians who have examined the minor does not constitute neglect." 52 This may exclude virtually all infant Doe situations
from the coverage of the neglect statute.
In New York, the state's highest court interpreted
its child neglect
5
3
statute in a similar way. In In re Hofbauer, the parents of an eight-yearold child with Hodgkin's disease sought laetrile injections and nutritional therapy for him. The parents rejected the conventional treatment of radiation and chemotherapy recommended by one physician,
and found another doctor who advocated the laetrile treatment. The
county social services department initiated a child neglect proceeding.
The Family Court found the parents were concerned, loving and conscientious in their efforts to secure medical care for their son. The neglect petition, based on a statute generally requiring parents to supply
"adequate" medical care, was dismissed. On appeal, the New York
51"Neglect" hardly describes the behavior of parents or doctors. As an editorial in the
New England Journal of Medicine observed, "most parents would give their lives for their
children," and doctors "are often accused of many wrongs in our society, but lack of therapeutic aggressiveness is not one of them." Angell, Handicapped Children: Baby Doe and Uncle
Sam, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 659, 660 (1983); see also Nolan, Imperiled Vewborns, 17 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 5 (1987)(new definitions "could include as abusers clinicians struggling to provide sensitive and humane care for infants").
52

CAL. PENAL CODE § 1165.2 (West Supp. 1988).
53 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979).
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Court of Appeals declared that while the statute did require the parents
to seek medical attention for their child, "great deference must be accorded a parent's choice as to the mode of medical treatment' 5 4to be
undertaken and the physician selected to administer the same."
This decision, as well as accepted scholarly treatments of the subject of neglect,5 5 views the legal concept of neglect as a minimalist one:
so long as parental behavior comes within a broad range of acceptable
conduct, parents need not fear intervention or prosecution by the government. A child protective agency that exercises rulemaking authority
over caring, responsible decisionmaking for infants by parents and physicians is improperly expanding the meaning of medical neglect and
consequently is acting beyond its statutory authority.56
III.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

State constitutions form the fundamental "law of the land" in a
state. Should a state court, examining its own constitutional principles,
determine that the infant treatment standards enacted by Congress invade the rights of parents or of the infants themselves, then the federal
54Id. at 655, 393 N.E.2d at 1013, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 940. Parents may rely upon the advice
of a duly licensed physician, the court continued, even if the advice is not "widely embraced
by the medical community." Id. at 652, 393 N.E.2d at 1011, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 938. In a statement with significant implications for typical infant Doe situations, the court wrote:
[U]ltimately, however, the most significant factor in determining whether a child is
being deprived of adequate medical care, and, thus, a neglected child within the
meaning of the statute, is whether the parents have provided an acceptable course of
medical treatment for their child in light of all the surrounding circumstances. This
inquiry cannot be posed in terms of whether the parent has made a 'right' or 'wrong'
decision, for the present state of the practice of medicine, despite its vast advances,
very seldom permits such definitive conclusions. Nor can a court assume the role of
a surrogate parent and establish as the objective criteria with which to evalutate a
parent's decision its own judgment as to the exact method or degree of medical
treatment which should be provided, for such standard is fraught with subjectivity.
Rather, in our view, the court's inquiry should be whether the parents, once having
been made aware of the seriousness of their child's affliction and the possibility of
cure if a certain mode of treatment is undertaken, have provided for their. child a
treatment which is recommended by their physician and which has not been totally
rejected by all responsible medical authority.
Id. at 656, 393 N.E.2d at 1014, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 940-4 1.
55 Two leading articles are: Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children From Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care and
Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1976); Areen, Intervention Between Parent and
Child. A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887 (1975).
56 As for any claim that the federal law, by placing its infant Doe choices in a definition of
medical "neglect," adequately has defined neglect for the states, consider an instructive riddle
traditionally attributed to Abraham Lincoln: "If you call a tail a leg, how many legs has a dog?
Five? No; calling a tail a leg don't make it a leg." J. BARTLETT, THE SHORTER BARTLETT'S
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 218(d) (1961). Similarly, calling nonaggressive care for infants suffer-

ing terribly from incurable conditions "neglect" doesn't make it neglect as that term has long
been used and understood. Lawyers and lawmakers above all must be aware of the difference
between semantic labelling and the reality those labels purport to describe. See supra note 51.
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standards must yield to those rights. As Judge Hans Linde, writing for
the Oregon Supreme Court in Salem College & Academy v. Employment
Div. 5 7 explains, "the state cannot violate its own constitution in order
to satisfy a federal program that Congress has not made obligatory
under the Supremacy Clause." 5 8 The Salem College case concerned a
Congressional statute that provided a monetary incentive to states to
set up unemployment systems with certain prescribed features. Noncompliance, the court observed, would mean forfeiting federal funding." Such a federal scheme does not invoke the Supremacy Clause,
which would otherwise make the federal law binding on the states.6 °
The court held that the Oregon state legislature, however eager to
qualify for federal dollars, could not accept the federal conditions concerning exemptions from coverage for certain religious schools, because the conditions violated state constitutional provisions.6
The federal infant Doe law is conceptually similar to the unemployment insurance statute considered by the Oregon Supreme Court. It is
part of a funding statute - the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act of 1974.62 To qualify for federal benefits, a state must adopt the
federal rule on required treatment for defective newborns. Failure to
do so is not a violation of the Supremacy Clause, but merely a disqualification from receiving the offered funding. Practically and politically,
states may covet such funding, but legally they are not compelled to
accept Congress' conditions.
Do state constitutions prohibit some of the conduct that Congress
insists upon in its infant Doe law? In many states, the probable answer
is yes. The answer for any particular state depends upon a variety of
factors including its constitutional text, interpretive history, precedent
and logic, positions taken on related legal and moral issues and traditions of respect for individual rights, family autonomy and family privacy. Case law about medical care for gravely ill infants is sparse, but a
study of the value choices underlying treatment refusals for such infants leads to serious doubts about the acceptability of the federal infant Doe law under state constitutions.
Textually, relevant provisions of state constitutions are clauses
protecting the right to privacy and the right to due process, and clauses
preserving unenumerated individual rights. "Privacy" is not mentioned explicitly in the U.S. Constitution, but it does appear in several
state charters. The constitutions of the states of Arizona and Washing57298 Or. 471, 695 P.2d 25 (1985).
58 Id. at 484, 695 P.2d at 34.
59 Id. at 477, 695 P.2d at 30.
60 Id. at 477, 695 P.2d at 29.
61 Id. at 484-92, 695 P.2d at 34-39.
6242 U.S.C. § 5101-5 (1984).
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ton, for example, both declare: "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his
,,6' The Alaska constitution states: "[t]he right of the
private affairs ....
people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed." 6 4 The California constitution recognizes "pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy" as an inalienable right.6 5 Montana's constitution
holds: "[t]he right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of
a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest."-6 6 In addition to such privacy clauses, various
state constitutional provisions reserve unenumerated rights to the people 67 and guarantee due process of law, 6 1 in much the same terms as
the federal Constitution.
Constitutional texts rarely give definitive answers to complex questions of due process, privacy and liberty. Brief constitutional sentences
or phrases beget the enduring and difficult problem of interpreting the
scope of individual rights in a wide variety of contexts. Hence precedent, history, tradition and contemporary community understandings
69
of constitutional values all play a role in constitutional analysis.
Moreover, while states interpret their own constitutions according to
their own lights, they often take note of federal constitutional developments. Since the privacy doctrine has been most visibly developed and
debated by the United States Supreme Court, it is worthwhile to examine the privacy concept enunciated by the Court.
Following the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut70 in 1965,

establishing the right of married couples to use contraceptives in their
own homes, claims raised in the Supreme Court about privacy have
often centered around personal and family life decisionmaking prerogatives. The Court stated, even prior to Griswold, that there is a "realm
63 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.

64 ALASKA CONST. art I,§ 22.
65 CAL. CONST. art I, § 1.
66

MONT. CONST. art II, § 10.

67 See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 25; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 23.
68 See, e.g. ARIZ. CONST. art. II,§ 4; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 24; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 25;

MICH. CONST. art. II,§ 17.
69 Writing of the importance of tradition, history and values in federal due process analysis, Justice Harlan once wrote of the crucial
balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That
tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it
could not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to
be sound .... The decision of an apparently novel claim must depend on grounds
which follow closely on well accepted principles and criteria. The new decision must

take its place in relation to what went before and further [cut] a channel for what is to
come.
Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-44 (1961)(Harlan, J., dissenting)(citation omitted).
70381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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of family life which the State may not enter."'" Each person, under the
Constitution, enjoys "a certain private sphere of individual liberty...
largely beyond the reach of government." ' 72 The right to privacy established by Griswold and its progeny is first and foremost a decisionmaking
right. 7' Among the matters left to private determination "are personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education." 74 Broadly speaking, the
Court has said the sorts of decisions worthy of constitutional protection
are those which are "personal and intimate ....
properly private ...
75
autonomy."
and
dignity
individual
to
basic
Parental decisionmaking for children is touched upon in several
Supreme Court decisions. In Stanley v. Illinois7 6 the Court, striking
down a presumption of Illinois law that unwed fathers are always unfit
to care for their own children, underlined the importance of maintaining the integrity of the family unit and stated: "[i]t is plain that the
interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children 'comes to this Court with a momentum for
respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely
from shifting economic arrangements.' 77
In Parham v. JR.7 8 the Court elaborated upon its belief in the primary role of parents in the social and legal order:
Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently
followed that course; our constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a child is 'the mere creature of the State'
....
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption
that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience,
and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult
decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that
71 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
72
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772
(1986).
73 "This right of personal privacy includes 'the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions'." Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684
(1977)(quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)).
74
Id. at 684-85 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973)).
75 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772. A new majority of the Court apparently has retreated
from such phrasing, speaking more narrowly of interests which are "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty ... or deeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradition." Bowers v. Hard(wick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986). Yet even under this standard, parental autonomy still
should be protected. See infra text accompanying notes 78-80.
76405 U.S. 645 (1972).

77 Id. at 651 (citation. omitted).
78442 U.S. 584 (1979)(upholding Georgia's informal, non-adversarial procedures permitting parents to commit child to a state mental institution).
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natural bonds of affection
lead parents to act in the best inter79
ests of their children.
The Court recognized that some parents disregard their child's interests, but concluded that this "is hardly a reason to discard wholesale
those pages of human experience that teach that parents generally
do act in their child's best interests. The statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some
parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American
80
tradition."
The Court has never had occasion to address the constitutional liberty and privacy questions raised by the infant Doe rule under consideration here. The argument might be made that the rule merely defines a
species of child neglect that is within the recognized power of the state
to regulate. I have previously suggested that most parental decisions to
forego aggressive treatments for infants do not at all resemble the classic cruelties of child abuse and neglect which the Court undoubtedly
had in mind when acknowledging the proper legal limits on parental
authority and independence."' How the Court would view a privacy
claim made by loving and concerned parents seeking to avoid statemandated aggressive treatment for a severely damaged infant is not
predictable from the precedents established by the Court so far. Dramatic confrontations among the justices have occurred in the 1980s
over the scope of privacy rights, signaling perhaps a greater resistance
82
to new claims under the privacy doctrine.
But where the U.S. Supreme Court leaves off, state supreme courts
have often ventured on, construing their own constitutions so as to expand and fortify personal privacy rights. As aptly expressed by Justice
Pollock of the NewJersey Supreme Court: "[a]lthough the state constitution may encompass a smaller universe than the Federal Constitution, our constellation of rights may be more complete."-8 3 Nationwide,
the "rediscovery by state supreme courts of the broader protections
afforded their own citizens by their state constitutions . . .is probably

the most important development in constitutional jurisprudence of our
times. "84
79 Id. at 602.
80 Id. at 602-03.
81 See supra text accompanying notes 50-55.
82 Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187 (1986)(majority opinion by White, J.)
with Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199, 214 (dissenting opinions by Blackmun, Stevens, JJ.), and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 785 (1986)(dissenting opinion by White, J.) with Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772 (concurring opinion by Stevens,
J.);see also supra note 58.

83 Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 300, 450 A.2d 925, 931 (1982).
84 Collins, Looking to the States, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at S-I (quotingJustice WilliamJ.
Brennan, Jr.).
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State courts have in fact developed a second line of cases that significantly affects the legal analysis of infant Doe treatment rules. This
set of cases, cutting across state boundaries (and, therefore, more aptly
termed a "front" of cases rather than a "line" of cases) suggests the
existence of an individual liberty/privacy interest belonging to the infant. Several key propositions have been established among the states.
First, there is a right to refuse ordinary medical treatment of any character, 5 including modern technological techniques that sustain life
without restoring health. 86 This right is widely recognized as originating in fundamental constitutional guarantees of individual liberty and
privacy. Indeed, several state courts have held this right to be pro8 7
tected by both state and federal constitutions.
Second, state courts have held that individuals who are not competent to make fundamental decisions for themselves, nevertheless still
have constitutionally protected liberty and privacy interests, despite the
inability of the individual to exercise them. A leading case is Conservatorship of Valerie N. ,8 in which the Supreme Court of California confronted state laws which provided no mechanism for authorizing the
sterilization of a severely mentally retarded 29-year-old woman. The
woman was unable to make choices for herself about bearing children
or using contraception. Her parents felt sterilization was the preferable
choice for her.
The court asked whether this woman had the "constitutional right
to have these decisions made for her, in this case by her parents as
conservators, in order to protect her interests in living the fullest and
most rewarding life of which she is capable." 8 9 The interests of the
incompetent woman, the court concluded, required that some procreative choices be made. While acknowledging her lack of decisionmaking
capacity, the court held that in the area of procreative choice, "the interests of the incompetent... do not differ from the interests of women
able to give voluntary consent to this procedure." 90 The decision to
allow sterilization was grounded in both the Fourteenth Amendment
and in the privacy clause of the state constitution. Other state supreme
courts agree with this approach, assuring that fundamental privacy
rights are extended to incompetents in a variety of decisionmaking
85 Schloendorffv. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914)(majority opinion by Cardozo, J.).

86 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
See, e.g., Rasmussen 11, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); Bouvia v. Superior Court,
179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
8840 Cal. 3d 143, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387, 707 P.2d 760 (1985).
8940 Cal. 3d at 160, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 393, 707 P.2d at 771.
9040 Cal. 3d at 162, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 399, 707 P.2d at 772.
87
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contexts. 9 ',
1
If incompetent persons have privacy rights, and if privacy -rights
include the right to refuse medical treatments, then presumably incompetent patients possess the right to refuse treatments. The Arizona
Supreme Court accepted this principle in Rasmussen v. Fleming.9 2 The
court considered the case of a woman in a nursing home existing in
what doctors diagnosed as a chronic vegetative state. She lay in a fetal
position, sustained by the administration of food and fluids through a
nasogastric tube. Her physician entered both a "do not resuscitate"
order (no medical resuscitation effort if she suffered cardiac arrest) and
a "do not hospitalize" order on her chart. As a consequence, she received comfort care, but in the words of the court, "certain diseases,
such as pneumonia, gangrene, and urinary tract infections were to run
93
their natural course."Ms. Rasmussen, though incompetent and never having previously
expressed her wishes concerning withholding of medical treatment,
continued to have a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment,
the court ruled. The value involved, said the court, was the value of
human dignity, which extends to competent and incompetent alike.9 4
Since the right to refuse treatment could not be exercised by the individual, a substitute decisionmaker had to be found. In the absence of
evidence of the patient's desires, that decisionmaker should be guided
by the best interests of the patient. 95 Family members are the obvious
choice to serve as'decisionmakers for patients unable to make their own
health care choices. Numerous state decisions support this designation. 96 Parents, of course, are traditionally the health care decisionmakers for children; their status as such is buttressed by the
97
constitutional cases discussed earlier.
91In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981); In re Moe, 386 Mass. App. Ct. 555, 432
N.E.2d 712 (1982); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d
485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d. 228,

608 P.2d 635 (1980).
92 Rasmussen 11, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987).
93
1d. at 212, 741 P.2d at 679.
94 Rasmussen 1, 154 Ariz. 200, 205-06, 741 P.2d 667, 668 (1987). The dignity value is
recognized in other cases. See, e.g., Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504
N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
95 Rasmussen 11, 154 Ariz. at 221, 741 P.2d at 688.
961n re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 53, 335 A.2d 647, 670 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976); In reJobes, 108 N.J. 394, 416, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (1987); Barber v. Superior Court,
147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493; see also Newman, Treatment Refusals for
the Critically and Terminally Ill: Proposed Rules for the Family, the Physician, and the State, 3 N.Y.L.

SCH. HUM. RTS. ANN. 35 (1985).
97 In reQuinlan, 70 N.J. at 53, 355 A.2d at 670; In reJobes 108 N.J. at 416, 529 A.2d at 445;
Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
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These points are now largely uncontrovertible. Much agreement
exists as to the extension of privacy rights to incompetents, the use of
substitute decisionmakers and the use of a best interest standard for
making the decision when no evidence of the incompetent's own wishes
exists. Substantial agreement also exists for the proposition that sometimes "a patient's best interests are served when medical treatment is
withheld or withdrawn." 98 The task remains of applying the foregoing
principles to a new legal problem. Whether parental decisionmaking
for impaired newborns is within the sphere of family privacy and the
individual liberty rights of infants depends upon an assessment of the
values underlying these concepts.
At root, the privacy and liberty rights found in some form in all
state constitutions spring from a cluster of values viewed as basic in
American legal and social culture. First is the value of autonomy, the
freedom to make key life choices without government coercion. Another is privacy in its classic sense, the right to keep personal matters
confidential, away from the probing scrutiny, meddling and possible
exploitation of others. A third is self-expression, the need to develop,
articulate and act upon one's moral, religious and philosophical values.
A fourth is intimacy, the experience of relating to certain others in a
unique way that nurtures the spirit and provides care and comfort
through difficult times. A fifth is the deep-seated desire to find purpose
and meaning in life, a goal which must be defined individually but
which includes a widely shared rejection of the sort of empty, meaningless existence that medical technology sometimes offers. Finally, notions of privacy and liberty are founded upon a tradition of respect for
the dignity of each human being. All of these interests, though separately stated, relate to each other in various and complex ways. Translating these values into legal rules and applying them to difficult
situations is a formidable task, but one which a constitution of broad
majesterial principles compels judges (and other public officials, who
too often leave such matters to judges) to undertake. In giving concrete meaning to terms such as "liberty" and "privacy," courts are acting on Justice White's observation that a constitution "is a document
announcing fundamental principles in value-laden terms that leave ample scope for the exercise of normative judgment by those charged with
interpreting and applying it.'' 9 9

Privacy cases typically feature a combination of these basic human
values. For example, the contraception and abortion cases protect the
98 Rasmussen 11, 154 Ariz. at 221, 741 P.2d at 688; see also In re Conservatorship of Torres,
357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984).
:9) Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 78889 (1986)(White,J., dissenting).
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autonomy of individuals in making the key life choice of whether to
bear or beget a child. In addition they preserve the privacy of intimate,
sexual relationships. Further, they permit couples to act upon their
moral and philosophical values, even as to controverted matters like
abortion and its troubling questions about the proper regard due to
incipient human life. Medical decisionmaking by parents for their infants also promotes society's realization of the values underlying privacy and liberty rights. The value of human dignity, explicitly cited in
several judicial opinions sanctioning treatment refusals,' 0 0 surely extends to infants. This value is manifest in the infants' profound interest
in humane treatment decisions that take into account their pain, their
suffering and their need for peace and respite from the sometimes
strenuous and stressful treatment regimes involved in high technology
neonatal intensive care. In the context of treatment decisions for desperately ill newborns, parents need the autonomy, privacy, intimacy
and freedom to express deep moral values that important family decisionmaking requires. They must consider the most difficult issues of
life, suffering and the prospect of death.'
What families need most in this tragic circumstance is a protective
cocoon for healing, reflection, sorrow and the expression of intimate
thoughts and emotions. Aggressive, intrusive outsiders are a disruptive
and unwelcome presence in these situations. The New York Court of
Appeals, criticizing the attempt by a right-to-life advocate to force treatment decisions upon parents of a severely impaired infant, wrote that
the interfering outsider "would catapult [himself] into the very heart of
a family circle, there to challenge the most private and most precious
responsibility vested in the parents for the care and nurture of their
100 Rasmussen 1, 154 Ariz. at 205-06, 741 P.2d at 668; see also Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485,
495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
101As I have written previously:
family privacy doctrines reflect the fact that we view family self-governance as a
highly prized value in American life. Its protected status under the Due Process
Clause evidences concern that majorities not regulate family decisionmaking in its
most intimate and sensitive functions. Responding to a severely incapacitating, irreversible illness of a member of the family unit is one of these functions. The impending death, permanent loss of consciousness, or near-complete mental and physical
incapacitation of a parent, spouse, or child is one of the most emotionally intense
experiences of family life. Dealing with such events requires family members to
gather their emotional strength, to seek solace from trusted intimates, and to bring
their personal moral, philosophical or religious convictions to bear for guidance and
comfort. By necessity, the experience must be shared with the strangers who render
care for the ill, but it is one that is otherwise entitled to a respectful and decent
privacy.
Newman, supra note 96, at 49-50 (citations omitted).
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This criticism of outside intrusion logically ought to

extend to government officials as well, should they routinely attempt to
03
interject themselves into these tragic situations.1
State invasion into family privacy at this time must be carefully limited to those situations in which it is clearly justified. While there is a
role for rulemaking in this area, legislatures and administrative officials
need to act with a circumspection appropriate to the "precious responsibility" being dealt with. As the Rasmussen court pointed out, the law
must address complex treatment issues "within permissible constitutional
limits."' 04 As the next section demonstrates, the infant Doe rule being
pressed upon the states by the federal government fails to respect the
basic values at stake in these situations, thereby breaching the constitutionally permissible limits of lawmaking.
IV.

SPECIFIC CLAUSES: INFIRMITIES UNDER
STATE CONSTITUTIONS

In this section I will examine several specific situations in which
infant care questions are addressed by the federal infant Doe rule contrary to sound state constitutional principles. In the section following, I
will discuss the more general failure of the rule to meet emerging state
constitutional norms.
A. - THE PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE

The federal law permits withholding of treatment for infants who
are "chronically and irreversibly .. comatose."' °5 Consider the case
of an infant in a persistent vegetative state (PVS), a condition that is
medically distinct from coma. With PVS, there is a sleep/wake cycle,
some random eye movement and some reflective response to deeply
painful stimuli. There is no consciousness, however, and no interaction
02

' Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 213, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1188, 469
N.Y.S.2d 63, 65, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983).
103 As Professor Clark has written, "[N]o court or state official and certainly no legislature
is able to experience the moral dilemma the parents face in these cases with the profound
concern which informs the parents' decision." 1 H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES 589 (2d. ed. 1987).
104 Rasmussen II, 154 Ariz. at 225, 741 P.2d at 692 (emphasis added). Of course, the roles
of legislatures and administrative agencies would, if the constitutional protections apply, be
severely circumscribed, since, as Justice Jackson once eloquently wrote:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officialsand to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts . ...
[F]undamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of
no elections.
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).

10542 U.S.C. § 5102(3)(A) (1984).
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with others or with the environment.' °6 It is truly a "twilight zone of
suspended animation" 1 0 7 which many, perhaps most people, would not
choose to prolong with noncurative techniques of medical
maintenance.
But it is not, medically speaking, a coma, which is a state of unconsciousness resembling sleep. Since medical organizations were actively
involved in the drafting of the bill, it is quite possible a court would give
to the term "coma" its medical meaning, believing Congress to have
chosen the word based upon medical knowledge and input. One lower
court in Minnesota has concluded that "coma" does not include PVS,
and that PVS is not covered by any of the other exceptions in the statute allowing nontreatment.' 0 8 This also appears to be the position of
the HHS.' 0 9
Yet broad legal support exists for the termination of life support
systems for patients in the vegetative state, including those who never
expressed their treatment/nontreatment preferences, upon the request
of the patient's family or guardian. State high courts have authorized
such nontreatment decisions.' 0 The President's Commission also supported withdrawal of treatment in cases of PVS."'' The landmark case
involving Karen Ann Quinlan" 12 permitted that young woman's father
to decide to turn off the mechanical life support apparatus that supported her existence in an irreversible vegetative state. "We have no
hesitancy in deciding," the court declared, "that no external compelling interest of the State could compel Karen to endure the
unendurable, . . .to vegetate .. .with no realistic possibility of re106 Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting the Facts Straight), 18
27, 28 (1988).
107Rasmussen 11, 154 Ariz. at 211, 741 P.2d at 678.
108 In re Steinhaus, No. J-86-92 (Minn. Fam. Ct. Sept. 11, 1986)(order denying motions to
dissolve a temporary restraining order preventing antibiotics treatment and to order that aggressive. treatment not be required). The court held that the exception for treatment that
merely prolonged dying, for example, did not apply since a person may continue in a persistent vegetative state for an indefinite time extending over many years. Neurologist Ronald E.
Cranford calls the statutory terminology "misleading" and a "medical oxymoron." He adds:
"I doubt that the various parties responsible for the language of the Amendments had a clear
idea of what they intended to mean and which specific neurologic conditions fell under the
designation 'chronically and irreversibly comatose.' " Cranford, supra note 106, at 28-29.
109 In the report of the Inspector General of the HHS, six incidents of non-compliance
with the statute were cited, anonymously. One involved an infant in the persistent vegetative
state; another involved an infant described only as having a brain stem, a condition that excludes the possibility of cognitive existence. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 32,
app. D, at 3.
110See Rasmussen 11, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674; In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d
365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
111 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 29, at 189-92.
1 12
1n re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
HASTINGS CENTER REP.
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turning to any semblance of cognitive or sapient life."" ' 3
The Supreme Court of Georgia, in In re L.H.R.," 4 held that parents have the right to exercise their infant child's constitutional right to
refuse treatment in the case of an infant who suffered a "medical catastrophe" 15 days after her apparently normal birth. The infant was left
in a chronic vegetative state, alive but with much brain tissue destroyed.
The Court's opinion noted the agreement of the attending neurologist
and an ad hoc infant care review committee composed of two pediatricians, a nurse, a social worker and the parent of a handicapped child.' '
Similarly, a Florida appeals court in In re Guardianshipof Barry 116 found
a permanently, irreversibly unconscious infant had a privacy right, exercisable by his parents, to reject medical treatment to maintain his
existence. The court, somewhat confusingly, referred to the infant's
condition both as a "chronic permanent vegetative coma" and as a
"permanent vegetative state."' 17 Neurologists testified that if mechanical ventilation were continued, the child would live anywhere from one
to five years.8 While the court was not concerned with distinctions in
medical terms between coma and PVS, there is little doubt that the
shared feature of both - a permanent irreversible lack of consciousness - led to the court's decision.
The Arizona Supreme Court in Rasmussen v. Fleming specifically
considered the differences between coma and PVS, and concluded that
for legal purposes there was no "material significance between the two
physical conditions."'' 1 The court recognized the constitutional right
to refuse treatment in a PVS case involving an adult woman. There is,
it is submitted, no reason to deny an infant "living" in a hopeless vegetative state the same constitutional consideration. The federal infant
Doe law, however, appears to sanction such a denial.
B.

VIRTUALLY FUTILE, INHUMANE TREATMENT

The statute creates an exception to required treatment when "the
provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the
survival of the infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances
would be inhumane."' 20 There are two problems raised by this provision, each so fundamental to infant and parental interests as to constitute likely breaches of state constitutional law. This is the only time the
113 Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
114 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984).
115 Id. at 439, 321 S.E.2d at 718.
116445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
117d. at 376.
8
11 Id. at 368.

119 Rasmussen II, 154 Ariz. 207, 218, 714 P.2d 674, 685 (1987).
12042 U.S.C. § 5102(3)(C) (1984).
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statute mentions humaneness as a consideration in making treatment
decisions for infants. It limits humane concerns to only those infants
for whom treatment would be virtually futile, (i.e., to those whose
deaths, even with treatment, are all but certain). Other infants, however intense their suffering and however severe and permanent their
physical and mental defects, are denied such humane consideration.
Their suffering, and the inhumaneness of adding to it by administering
painful and stressful treatment, is not recognized by the statute as relevant to the decision to treat. If their chances of survival are low, but not
low enough to make treatment "virtually futile," then they must be
1 21
treated, however inhumanely.
Theologian John J. Paris poses the case of a very premature infant
with signs of viral encephalitis. 12 2 There is extensive brain damage, severe mental retardation and the risk of uncontrollable convulsions,
deafness, blindness and quadraplegia. The infant may die, but there is
some chance she will survive with all of these handicaps. If the infant
develops more difficulties - life-threatening infections, cardiac arrest
- must treatments be given to keep the infant alive? Under the statute,
aggressive care is required. To mobilize the full panoply of intensive
care technology to keep this infant alive through all the medical crises
that beset her, no matter how painful and invasive the treatments, and
in total disregard of her already profound suffering and nearly total
incapacitation, seems senseless and cruel. To suggest that the opposition of parents and physicians to vigorous treatment efforts must be
overridden by law is an extreme assertion of state power over the infant, the family and the medical profession. State courts that have acknowledged the legitimacy of such factors as painfulness and
invasiveness of treatment, level of functioning expected after treatment
and suffering of the patient, in decisionmaking for incompetent adults,
would be hard pressed to dismiss these factors in decisionmaking for
infants. 123
This provision does more than require extensive and painful treatment without regard for the infant's overall suffering. An equally disturbing, constitutionally challengeable feature of this provision is its
insistence that in some cases, treatments judged to be "virtually futile"
must neveretheless be performed. Under the statute, treatments that
are virtually futile may be foregone only if the treatments also are "inhumane." It is a plausible interpretation of this joint requirement of
supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
122 Paris, Terminating Treatment for Newborns: A Theological Perspective, 10
121 See

HEALTH CARE

LAW MED.

&

120 (1982).

123 For a recent case considering these and other factors, see In re Beth Israel Med.
Center, 136 Misc. 2d 931, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Sup. Ct. 1987). For a discussion of factors
relevant to infant Doe decisions, see infra text accompanying notes 204-19.
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virtual futility and inhumaneness that certain treatments, those not so
painful or invasive as to be deemed inhumane, must be performed even
if doctors have little expectation that they will work.
Requiring virtually futile treatment, even relatively mild treatments, traverses the proper constitutional bounds of a compulsory
treatment statute. To tell parents they must agree to treatments that
are deemed virtually hopeless by their doctors, in all probability doing
nothing more than prolonging suffering for their infant, is morally offensive and a substantial infringement of the privacy and liberty interests previously outlined. As the appellate panel in Barber v. Superior
Court observed, in upholding a family decision to reject treatment for a
family member: "[A] treatment course which is only minimally painful
or intrusive may nonetheless be considered disproportionate to the potential benefits if the prognosis
is virtually hopeless for any significant
24
condition."
in
improvement
The infant Doe law fails here because of its focus on the treatment
instead of the patient. As John J. Paris has written of artificial feeding
techniques:
[N]o matter how simple, inexpensive, readily available,
noninvasive, and common the procedure, if it does not offer
substantial hope of benefit to the patient, he has no moral obligation to undergo it, nor the physician to provide it, nor the
125
judge to order it.

A sick person, whether infant or adult, has a right to decisionmaking
that turns on benefit to the patient, not on categorization of the treatment. The federal law's perverse insistence that infants undergo a wide
range of "virtually futile" treatments surely contravenes these infants'
fundamental interests in care that is not merely aggressive, but also
effective.
C.

FOOD, FLUIDS AND MEDICATION

The federal law requires the administration of "appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medication, ' 2 6 even in the extreme medical circumstances that justify the withholding of all other life sustaining
interventions. The meaning of "appropriate" in this context is hardly
clear. Is it appropriate to feed an infant who is unable to suck or swal124Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491
(1983); see also Rasmussen H, 154 Ariz. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689 (for patient in vegetative state
"any medical treatment... would have provided minimal, if any, benefits;" no medications or
even hospitalization required).
125 Paris, When Burdens of Feeding Outweigh Benefits, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1986, at
30, 32.
12642 U.S.C. § 5102(3) (1984).
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low, or whose damaged system is unable to digest? Is it appropriate to
insert feeding tubes into an infant who is in a permanent vegetative
state? Can the benefits and burdens of artificial feeding be weighed in
determining appropriateness, or must the benefit be assumed to be
worth any burden associated with the treatment technique that successfully provides food, water and medication?
The single word "appropriate" does not contain enough meaning
to answer these questions. In the absence of a clear directive on the
point, courts may rely on professional medical practice in the community, perceived overall statutory purposes, selected statements in the
legislative history or on notions of what is right. Predicting judicial outcomes under such circumstances is a hazardous undertaking. "Appropriate" could mean that the intervention should confer a net benefit
upon the patient, considering the patient's prognosis, life expectancy,
state of consciousness or the lack thereof and other factors pertinent to
a benefits and burdens analysis. 127 But the overall restrictiveness of the
statute and the plausible implication that food, water and medication
are "routine care" for even the sickest patient, may lead courts to interpret "appropriate" as merely a grant of medical discretion to choose a
suitable technique.
Requiring food and water sounds appealing, and where infants are
concerned, feeding has a strong emotional component symbolizing caring and closeness. But in the medical context, these positive connotations often pale beside the reality of incurable disease, invasive
techniques and the risks and complications that attend all medical interventions.'
Does the fatally stricken child whose suffering is intense
truly benefit from efforts to force nutrients into the body? Does the
permanently vegetative infant, whose damaged brain can support vital
signs but not consciousness, truly benefit from feeding tubes that may
prolong a vegetative existence for years? The statute is unconcerned
with such questions, but they are ones which parents may rightfully
consider in making decisions about medical treatments for their severely damaged newborn. Making the provision of food, water and
medication compulsory in all cases in which it is technically possible
may keep lives going after respirators and mechanical monitors have
been turned off. But if death is merely drawn out as a result, this requirement violates state constitutional norms that permit the refusal of
29
treatments that merely prolong death.'
127 For discussion of all factors, see infra text accompanying notes 204-19.
128 For a discussion of treatment problems associated with artificial feeding, see In re
Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 201-06, 464 N.E.2d 959, 961-62 (1984).
129 See Rasmussen 11, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810,

689 P.2d 1372 (1984); Severns v. Wilmington Med. Center, 421 A.2d 1134 (Del. 1980). For
further compelling examples, see Paris & Fletcher, Infant Doe Regulations and the Absohte Re-
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The special status the federal rule gives to medical interventions
that provide food and fluids has been rejected by state courts across the
country. 130 The New Jersey Supreme Court, rejecting a special distinction between medical interventions generally and interventions that
provide food and fluids, observed:
Once one enters the realm of complex, high-technology medical care, it is hard to shed the "emotional symbolism" of food.
However, artificial feedings such as nasogastric tubes, gastrostomies, and intravenous infusions are significantly different
from bottle-feeding or spoonfeeding - they are medical procedures with inherent risks and possible side effects, instituted
by skilled healthcare providers to compensate for impaired
physical functioning. Analytically, artificial feeding by means
of a nasogastric tube or intravenous infusion can be seen as
equivalent to artificial breathing by means of a respirator.
Both prolong life through mechanical means when the body is
no longer able to perform a vital bodily function on its own.
Furthermore, while nasogastric feeding and other medical
procedures to ensure nutrition and hydration are usually well
tolerated, they are not free from risks or burdens; they have
complications that are sometimes serious and distressing to
the patient. Nasogastric tubes may lead to pneumonia, cause
irritation and discomfort, and require arm restraints for an incompetent patient. The volume of fluids needed to carry nutrients itself is sometimes harmful.
Finally, dehydration may well not be distressing or painful
to a dying patient. For patients who are unable to sense hunger and thirst, withholding of feeding devices such as nasogastric tubes may not result in more pain than the termination of
any other medical treatment. Indeed, it has been observed
that patients near death who are not receiving nourishment
may be more comfortable than patients in comparable conditions who are being fed and hydrated artifically. Thus, it cannot be assumed that it will always be beneficial for an
incompetent patient to receive artificial feeding or harmful for
quirement to. Use .Vourishment and Fluids for the Dyving Infant, 11 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 210

(1983).
130 See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986);
Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai

Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 527 N.E.2d 626 (1986); see also In re Caulk, 125 N.H. 226, 480 A.2d 93

(1984)(constitutional right to die recognized, but state interest in preventing prisoner hunger
strike overrides).
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him not to receive it.131
Professional medical authorities,"12 the President's Commission,' 33
scholars'" 4 and physicians 135 accept this position as well. While none
of the cases on this point involved the infant Doe statute, infants as well
as adults have an important constitutional interest in having the benefits, burdens and risks of medical feeding techniques carefully weighed
and balanced, not ordered by rule of law.
What has been said about the right to reject artificial nutrition and
hydration techniques applies to medications as well. In Rasmussen v.
Fleming,'3 6 the Arizona Supreme Court permitted a "do not resuscitate" (DNR) and a "do not hospitalize" (DNH) order to be entered for
an elderly nursing home patient in an irreversible vegetative state. The
effect of the DNH order was to permit medical personnel "to provide
only basic comfort care. Certain diseases, such as pneumonia, gan37
grene, and urinary tract infections, were to run their natural course."1
The court accepted the proposition that the patient, through a guardian assessing and asserting her best interests, had the constitutional
right to refuse medical treatment. No special status was afforded to
medications for pneumonia or other infections commonly regarded as
treatable. Requiring treatment, the court noted, would serve only to
38
postpone Ms. Rasmussen's death, rather than to improve her life.1

The federal law's insistence on medication, even for the comatose
and the fatally ill newborn, fails to take account of the truth that some
kinds of deaths are worse than others. If an infant is dying of Tay-Sachs
disease, a non-medicated pneumonia infection may present an alternative cause of death less beset with terrible pain and suffering. As Professor M. Pabst Battin has written, "certain conditions will produce a
death that is more comfortable, more decent, more predictable, and
39
more permitting of conscious and peaceful experience than others.'
Choosing not to medicate is sometimes a way to achieve a more humane outcome. It should be, as the Rasmussen court held, part of the
131In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 372-74, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236 (1985)(citing Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (1983)).

132 See, e.g., In rePeter, 108 N.J. 365, 381-82, 529 A.2d 419, 427-28 (1987); Brophy, 398
Mass. at 439-40, 497 N.E.2d at 68.
13 Supra note 29, at 90, 201.
134See, e.g., Rhoden, supra note 13, at 1283; Paris & Fletcher, supra note 129, at 210.
5See, e.g., Lo & Dornbrand, Sounding Board.- Guiding the Hand that Feeds - Caringfor the
Demented Elderly, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 402, 403-04 (1984); Cranford, supra note 106, at 31.
136Rasmussen 11, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987).

137Id. at 212, 741 P.2d at 679.
138 Id. at 217, 741 P.2d at 684; accord In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372
(1984); Severns v. Wilmington Med. Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980).
139Battin, The Least lWorst Death, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1983, at 13, 15.
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constitutional right to refuse treatment, exercisable on an incompetent's behalf by a surrogate decisionmaker.
D.

Low BIRTH WEIGHT INFANTS

The federal statute does not make special note of the dilemmas of
care for very premature infants. Yet these infants experience a wide
range of complex medical problems which they often do not survive,
and are at serious risk of mental retardation, cerebral palsy, disorders
of vital organs, bleeding in the brain and blindness.' 4 °
The treatment of very low birth weight, premature infants constitutes one of the frontiers in neonatal medicine. Survival rates drop dramatically at low birth weight levels. One study 14 ' reported the survival
rate for infants born in a three year period at a major perinatal hospital
to be 98 percent for infants weighing between 1500 and 2499 grams,
86 percent for those weighing 100 to 1499 grams, 67 percent for those
weighing 750 to 999 grams and 26 percent for those weighing 500 to
749 grams. All infants below 500 grams died. The researchers conducting the study compiled data on 98 live-born infants who weighed
less than 750 grams. Fifty-six died in the delivery area; twenty-two
others died in the intensive care unit (NICU). The authors reported
that "[d]eath among he infants transferred to the NICU during the
first year of the study tended to be ascribed to immature lung development whereas during the second and third years, as the infants lived
longer, the causes of death tended to be disease-related or treatmentrelated....,, 4 2 Aggressive treatment thus had a double-edged effect:
it initially sustained the lives of some of the smallest infants, but in a
state so fragile that the diseases and treatments of prematurity killed
them.
Infants recorded as intensive care unit survivors may not fare well
after discharge. They may be re-hospitalized, institutionalized or die of
their condition. 143 Noting the high economic costs involved, the high
140 Hack & Fanaroff, Changes in the Delivery Room Care of the Extremely Small Infant (< 750 g);
Effects on Morbidity and Outcome, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 660, 662 (1986); Sinclair, Torrance,
Boyle, Horwood, Saigal & Sackett, Evaluation of Neonatal Intensive-Care Programs, 305 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 489, 489 (1981); Lyons, Physical and Mental DisabilitiesIn Newborns Doubled In 25 Years,

N.Y. Times, July 18, 1983, at AI, col. 3.
141 Hack & Fanaroff, supra note 140, at 660.
142 Id. at 662.
143 The researchers reported:

[T]hree mothers of the 11 survivors born during the period July 1982 to June 1984
did not assume full care of their children. One infant was placed for adoption, one
was placed in a long-term care facility, and the third was placed in foster care because
of suspected abuse five months after discharge. Seven children (64 percent) were
rehospitalized during the first year of life, including one child with chronic lung disease who required a tracheostiny and assisted ventilation for nine months and then
multiple hospitalizations mail dealth :1 Iwo years of age. Neurologic and develop-
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incidence of mortality and morbidity and the prolonged hospital stays,
the authors of the study questioned the value of the trend "whereby
intensive care is applied to progressively smaller immature infants." 14 4
This trend may take on a momentum of its own. At their own hospital,
the authors reported, "[t]he increased application of neonatal intensive
care ... did not result from a specific policy, but evolved gradually over
the three-year period reviewed."' 4 5
The assault on a medical frontier is usually associated with new
medications or procedures that are frankly and unambiguously experimental. Although there has not been much discussion of this aspect of
neonatal care, there is reason to believe that a good deal of what goes
on in the intensive care nursery is in some important sense experimental. In 1983, a committee of distinguished physicians and lawyers of the
American Society of Law & Medicine observed that "many of the treatments are experimental" in newborn care. 1 46 Shelp writes that "much
of neonatal medicine is research and experimentation - it is an 'infant'
subspecialty that utilizes innovative procedures in the hope of acceptable results."' 14 7 Jonsen and Lister, writing in 1978, observed that
"[p]erinatal medicine, despite its intended therapeutic function, is, in a
' 48
most thorough sense, experimental medicine."'
Robert Weir notes that the conservative Christian ethicist Paul
Ramsey, whose writings strongly favor treatment of neonates under
most circumstances, felt that "treatment often given premature infants
does not seem directed at caring for them as individual patients but
rather appears to be experimental in nature."'' 4 9 Even HHS at some
point in its attempts to assert regulatory authority over newborn care
noted that it would be proper to withhold "extraordinary care from an
extremely low birthweight infant. ' "'5
The matter is, or should be, one of considerable legal significance.
mental assessments were performed at a mean corrected age of 8 and 20 months,

respectively. [Footnotes omitted.] Four infants had transient hypotonia during their
first year. None have cerebral palsy or hydrocephalus. One child is blind.

Id. at 663.
144Id. at 664.
45

1 Id. at 663.

146 Committee on the Legal and Ethical Aspects of Health Care for Children, Comments
and Recommendations on the "Infant Doe" Proposed Regulations, I1 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 203

(1983).
147
48

1

E.

SHELP, BORN TO DIE? DECIDING THE FATE OF CRITICALLY ILL NEWBORNS

99 (1986).

Jonsen & Lister, Newborn Intensive Care: The Ethical Problems, 8 HASTINGS CENTER REP.

15, 16 (1978).
149 R. WEIR, SELECTIVE NONTREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS

149 (1984).

-

15045 C.F.R. § 84, app. § 84 C(a)(5)(iv), 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846, 30,852 (1983); see also 49
Fed. Reg. 1654 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1984). The HHS did not reiterate this suggestion in its
interpretive rules for the infant Doe statute. It did acknowledge the general proposition that

experimental procedures cannot be compelled by law. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,886 (1985).
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For all areas of medicine, there is a strong tradition in law and ethics
requiring informed consent as a precondition to ethically performed
research on human beings. 5 ' Parental consent is required of all research involving children, including experimental therapy offered with
the genuine hope that it will benefit the child.'" 2 A law like the federal
infant Doe rule, which deprives parents of the right to make treatment
decisions, would face serious constitutional challenge if found to apply
to fundamentally experimental procedures. The difficulty comes in defining what is "experimental." Experimental techniques are clear when
unprecedented procedures are used in a protocol formally submitted to
a hospital's institutional review board. When doctors at Loma Linda
University Medical Center transplanted a baboon's heart into a baby
girl in 1984, for example, 15 3 there was no doubt that the transplant was
experimental. There was also no doubt that the consent of the infant's
parents was essential.
When medical hypotheses are rigorously tested, presented in the
professional literature and subject to widespread scrutiny and criticism,
truly worthy techniques pass from the domain of research to the domain of accepted conventional therapy. The precise moment of passage is impossible to ascertain. Indeed, there is no exact moment, but a
transition time in which a therapeutic idea is more or less accepted,
more or less regarded as useful in certain generally defined situations.
Reservations and clarifications follow any breakthrough, limiting and
defining it until the new idea takes its proper place in the grand order
of things medical. Apparent successes that fail to withstand the process
of professional scrutiny eventually, perhaps years later, fall by the
wayside.
Thus the line between experimental and conventional medicine is
not always laser sharp. Line-drawing is made even more difficult by the
fact that many treatment therapies which are in use do not go through
the rigors of meticulous scientific research and analysis. Among other
factors, logistics, costs and the availability of capable researchers and
willing participants, limit the amount of research done in any given part
151See Annas, Death and the Magic lachine: Informed Consent to the Artificial Heart, 9 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 89, 91 (1987). For a classical article on the ethical blindness of enthused medical
experimenters, see Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1354 (1966); see
also Rothman, Ethics and Human Experimentation: Henry Beecher Revisited, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED.

1195 (1987)(review of Beecher article on the twenty-first anniversary of its publication).
152 NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

RESEARCH

INVOLVING CHILDREN

12-19

(1977)[hereinafter RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN].

153See generally Capron, Regan, Reemtsma, Sheldon, McCormick & Gore, The Subject is
Baby Fae, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 8 (1985)(collection of articles).
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of medicine.' 5 4 In the absence of a scientifically documented research
base, practitioners resort to innovation and medical improvisation
based loosely on experience, guesswork, limited data and hope.' 5 5
While improvisation appeals to physicians trying to save lives, it can
have some deleterious, even tragic, effects on newborns. As Jonsen and
Lister observed in 1978:
[The neonatologist] can apply a multiplicity of medicines and
procedures that are sound elsewhere but that may be useless
or harmful in this new patient. Indeed, the rapidly growing
body of scientific information may often create therapeutic
havoc: in the enthusiasm to apply the information to management of the newborn its highly experimental or even untested
56
origins are forgotten.
A national report on research involving children, commenting on the
"history of misadventures from .

.

. untested and unvalidated innova-

tion" conveys the danger of new medical techniques in the hospital
nursery:
[I]ntroduction of the practice of supplying oxygen in high concentrations to premature infants with hyaline membrane disease to enable them to survive was successful in many cases.
However, the price paid for this course of action was the blinding of thousands of children due to retrolental fibroplasia
before it was found that high oxygen levels had a toxic effect
on the blood vessels supplying the retina in premature infants.
Another iatrogenic disease whose cause went undetected
for years was the "gray-baby syndrome," which resulted in the
death of many newborn infants until a research project (terminated early because the results were so clear) demonstrated
that the drug chloramplienicol was responsible. This drug was
an effective and generally safe antibiotic in adults, and it had
been extended to use in children and infants without special
study.... Another antibacterial agent, sulfisoxazole, was also
abandoned for use in newborn infants after it was shown to
cause severe neural injury (kernicterus) and cerebral palsy....
154 BAILAR, INTRODUCTION TO CLINICAL TRIALS: ISSUES AND APPROACHES

11 (1983)("prac-

tical constraints ensure that most treatments escape ... vigorous evaluation").
155 This is evident when reading accounts of everyday experiences in neonatal intensive
care units. See, e.g., F. FROHOCK, SPECIAL CARE (1986);J. GUILLEMIN & L. HOLMSTROM, MIXED
BLESSINGS: INTENSIVE CARE FOR NEWBORNS (1986). The authors of MIXED BLESSINGS suggest
that very low birthweight and other newborns whose conditions involve poor chances of
clinical success be "clearly designated as experimental patients," in order "to foster an overt
acknowledgment that latent experiments are taking place, sometimes as erratic forays in
clinical problem solving." J. GUILLEMIN & L. HOLSTROM, supra, at 274.
56
1 Jonsen & Lister, supra note 148, at 16.
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Use of Vitamin K to prevent hemorrhagic disease of the newborn was a major advance, but its use in excessive doses also
produced many cases of kernicterus due to its destruction of
red blood cells with resultant increase in bilirubin levels, until
research demonstrated this danger and established a safe and
effective dose ....

In sum, there is historical evidence of unde-

sirable consequences resulting from the introduction of inno57
vations in pediatric practice without adequate research.'
The federal infant Doe rule ignores the problems posed by innovative medical treatments. If such treatments, lying in the twilight zone

between pure experimentation and conventional medical therapy, present a hope of survival that is not futile (or virtually futile and inhumane), these treatments are arguably required under the rule despite
any parental objection. This interpretation of the rule may seem quite
plausible to a court or administrative official, particularly if medical
professionals do not admit the full extent of their untested, risk-prone,
uncertain and stressful interventions. Physicians' inclinations, it has
often been noted, tend toward aggressive treatment. 158 Doctors may
represent their treatment choices as "conventional" rather than "experimental." Those already oriented toward medical intervention may
see their decisions as "medically indicated" (in the words of the statute)
157 RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN, supra note 152, at 23-26. The report said further

that:
Even such a seemingly simple matter as feeding and hydrating a newborn infant has,
without proper research, been subject to faddism and untested innovation. Because
premature infants tend to look edematous, for years it was routine practice to give
them no food or water for 48 to 72 hours after birth, with a high incidence of brain
damage ensuing from an excessive amount of sodium in the blood of the few who
survived the drying out procedure. Despite abandonment of such practices and conduct of much research, there still exists no general agreement on when to begin
feedings for premature infants and how much of what to give.
Another standard treatment, whose adverse effects continue to be manifested 20
to 30 years later in the form of radiation-induced thyroid cancer, was prophylactic
radiation to the neck and chest, used in the 1940's to shrink an infant's thymus. This
treatment was administered on the hypothesis that it would prevent the sudden infant death syndrome, with no basis in fact other than the observation that many victims of the syndrome had an enlarged thymus at autopsy. . . . There are other
standard practices whose effects remain matters of speculation. For example, concern is currently being expressed over the practice of isolating premature infants
from their parents in intensive care nurseries, based on evidence from research that
shows the importance of very early physical contact between the mother and infant
for the establishment of parental bonding, and the significantly higher incidence of
child abuse of premature infants.
Id. at 24-25.
158 See, e.g., J. GUILLEMIN & L. HOLMSTROM, supra note 155, at 282 ("[A] major problem in
the high-level nursery is the automatic, even routine nature of aggressive intervention." It is
overtreating newborns, rather than failing to treat, that is the "more common jeopardy.");
Duff, Counseling Families and Deciding Care of Severely Defective Children: A Jlay of Coping with 'Medical Vietnam', 67 PEDIATRICS 315, 316 (1981).

BABY DOE, CONGRESS AND THE STATES

rather than as personal or professional preferences for innovative or
experimental rescue attempts. It is also part of human nature to justify
what one wants to do by portraying it as necessary and good for

others. 159
Courts must be alert to the use of "untested and unvalidated" procedures in neonatal medicine. When such procedures go under the
name "innovative," they become associated with that term's positive
connotations of progress and ingenuity. But innovation has its dark
side of risk, mistake and failure. Parents confronted with the benefits
and burdens of "the latest" in neonatal treatment techniques should
not be forced to put their infants through the rigors of treatments that
carry little guarantee of success. Based upon the liberty and privacy
interests previously identified, 6 ' the state should let caring parents
weigh the risks, dangers and uncertainties of proposed treatments that
are reasonably capable of classification as "experimental," including
"innovative" techniques now in use. Some parents, of course, will opt
for these techniques, finding the risks acceptable. But others may
choose to forego procedures that are chancy and perilous, and they
should have the right to do so.
V.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF A BENEFITS
AND BURDENS ANALYSIS

The foregoing section shows that the federal infant Doe standard
improperly requires treatment in a variety of specific situations. In
some instances, it requires treatment even if that treatment offers no
substantial hope of benefit to the infant. In others it requires treatment
when treating would produce, prolong or increase intense suffering. In
still others it would mandate treatment even if its sole realizable aim
would be to preserve a life of total, permanent and devastating incapacity. In each of these instances, the federal rule violates widely recognized state constitutional norms.
The federal law fails on a more general level as well, by not making
the consideration of benefits and burdens of treatment the linchpin of
analysis for medical decisionmaking for impaired infants. Underlying
the statute is a presumption that treatment is always a benefit except
when death is all but certain. It is dismissive of all the burdens that
severely ill or deformed infants must bear, and of parents who would
159 Professor Joseph Goldstein begins an article with this quotation: "Of all tyrannies a
tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive . ...
[T]hose who torment us for our own good will torment us without end for they do so with the
approval of their own conscience." Goldstein, Medical Care For The Child At Risk: On State
Supervention Of ParentalAutonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 645 (1977)(quoting Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 RES JUDICATAE 224, 228 (1952)).
60
1 See supra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
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consider and weigh the perils of treating against the chances of success.
To deny parents the right to consider and weigh all the risks and burdens that treatment regimes entail is a defect that may render the statute unconstitutional on its face.
In reading the statute it is easy to overlook the burdens that infants
must sometimes endure. A severely compromised existence may involve a degree of pain and suffering that is difficult to comprehend.
Some of nature's work is extremely brutal. Requiring medical interventions to prolong the survival, even for a number of years, of the victims
of Tay-Sachs disease or Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, for example, ignores
the cruelty of their afflictions. Weir has written of these conditions:
[N]ewborns who inherit the autosomal recessive condition of
Tay-Sachs disease . .. appear normal for approximately six

months, then have an inexorable decline toward a totally vegetative existence followed by death when they are three or four
years of age. The progressive loss of contact with parents and
the environment is characterized by profound mental retardation, convulsions, paralysis, blindness, inability to feed orally,
and severe weight loss.
Male neonates who inherit the X-linked recessive condition of Lesch-Nyhan syndrome also appear normal at birth,
then at approximately six months begin a process of neurological and physiological deterioration first evidenced by athetosis (ceaseless, involuntary writhing movements). Along with
severe mental deficiency, the most striking neurological feature of this condition is compulsive self-mutilation that requires placing the elbows in splints, wrapping the hands in
gauze, and sometimes extracting the teeth. Even then, children with this condition often bang their heads against inani6
mate objects or take out their aggression on other persons.' '
Other conditions can so severely deform, incapacitate and cause
pain to their victims that the worth of efforts to sustain their lives is
legitimately open to question. It would be impossible to compile a catalogue of conditions that burden afflicted infants with, in Englehardt's
telling phrase, "the injury of continued existence."' 6 2 A few conditions, such as Tay-Sachs, Lesch-Nyhan, and the permanent vegetative
state, are clearly included. But for others, judgment must be founded
upon a knowledge of, and an empathy with, the particular infant's
suffering.
161R. WEIR, supra note 149, at 237 (citations omitted). For a description of a number of
other devastating birth defects, see Rhoden, supra note 13, at 1287-94.
162 Engelhart, Euthanasia and Children: The hliur, of Continued Existence, 83J. PEDIATRICS 170
(1973).
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Infants must bear burdens beyond those associated with their afflictions, including those imposed by treatment itself. Some treatments
are highly invasive and painful. Tube insertions and replacements,
drawing of blood, administration of medications, resuscitations and
surgery may be required repeatedly. The pain of certain procedures
may be increased by common medical practices, including the performance of surgery without anesthesia.' 6 3 Some treatments are dangerous
to the newborn. Hyaline membrane disease, a common problem in
very premature infants, is a lung disorder with often fatal consequences
for its victims. These infants, notes the President's Commission, "must
be placed on mechanical ventilators to counteract the insufficient oxygen supply associated with this condition; like the disorder, this treatment
can cause substantialmorbidity and mortality." 164 In a footnote the Commission elaborates:
[S]ome infants will require long-term tracheostomy, in which a
tube is inserted in the neck to create an adequate airway.
These infants cannot make sounds and require continuous
special nursing care. Therapeutic doses of oxygen used to
treat RDS [respiratory distress syndrome, caused by hyaline
membrane disease] can also lead to rentrolental fibroplasia, a
cause of blindness. And the mechanical ventilation can
cause
65
damage.'
lung
progressive
sometimes
and
permanent
Jonsen and Lister, in an article describing the perils of the relatively new specialty of perinatal medicine, state:
Iatrogenicity is endemic in perinatology. It is often generated

by the application of common therapeutics to the immature
organism; it is aggravated by the application of these therapeutics in desperate situations. .

haunt the nursery every day.'

66

.

. [Iatrogenic problems]

The duration of treatment also affects the extent to which it is burdensome. As Dr. Erich Loewy observes: "[i]mposing a burden briefly
may be defensible; imposing one lasting a longer time is more open to
163 Two Harvard researchers report that "[niewborns are frequently not given analgesic
or anesthetic agents during invasive procedures, including surgery. Despite recommendations to the contrary in textbooks on pediatric anesthesiology, the clinical practice of inducing
minimal or no anesthesia in newborns, particularly if they are premature, is widespread."
Anand & Hickey, Pain and Its Effects in the Human Neonate and Fetus, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1321

(1987). Other procedures are performed routinely without consideration of pain. Fletcher,
Pain in the Neonate, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1347 (1987).
164PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 29, at 200 (emphasis added).
16 5

1d. at 200 n.17.

66

1 Jonsen & Lister, supra note 148, at 16 (latrogenicity is an abnormal condition induced

in a patient by the effects of treatment by a doctor).
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question." '67 Stays in the neonatal intensive care unit can last for sev68
eral months, with treatments of various kinds administered daily.'
Lengthy hospitalization deprives infants of the physical, psychological
and developmental benefits of home life and parental nurturance.
When an infant dies despite painful, prolonged treatment that provided
no substantial hope from the outset, parents and others rightfully wonder whether the baby's best interests were served by pressing on with
aggressive treatment efforts. The infant who undergoes extensive
treatment may experience a terrible, tormenting existence. The parents of an infant born near the frontier of viability, weighing 800 grams,
with lung problems and various other complications associated with
prematurity, described their son as having been "saved" by the respirator to endure countless suctionings, tube insertions, blood samplings
and blood transfusions.
"[S]aved" to develop retrolental fibroplasia, numerous infections, demineralized and fractured bones, an iatrogenic cleft
palate, and, finally, as his lungs became irreparably diseased,
pulmonary artery hypertension and seizures of the brain. He
was, in effect, "saved" by the respirator to die five long, painful and expensive months later of the respirator's "side effects."
One doctor
explained
Andrew's
continued
dependence on the respirator and lack of effort to breathe for
himself by suggesting that, with all those broken ribs, it "hurts
16
like hell every time he takes a breath."' 1
Given the potential for grave burdens accompanying treatment, infants, like all other incompetent individuals, deserve the right to have
harms to themselves given full consideration in health care decisionmaking. In dire medical circumstances, there are no absolutes. We
know from experience and from wide discussion of the notion of death
with dignity that people in extreme circumstances care deeply about
the nature of their existence and give careful consideration to the difficulties of submitting to medical treatment regimes, even life-saving
ones, that place heavy burdens on themselves. Legal, medical and ethical thinking support the centrality of a benefits/burdens analysis to
167Loewy, Treatment Decisions in the Mentally Impaired, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1465, 1468
(1987).
168See F. FROHOCK, supra note 155 (describing cases of long term treatment in neonatal

intensive care units);J. GUILLEMIN & L. HOLMSTROM, supra note 155, at 241-42; see also Fisher
& Stevenson, The Consequences of Uncertainty: An EmpiricalApproach to M1ledical Decision Making in
Neonatal Intensive Care, 258J. A.M.A. 1929 (1 9 8 7 )("In any setting other than an intensive care
unit, a daily routine that involved restraining neonates in bed, placing plastic tubes .. .into
various body orifices, and pricking the feet with needles ... would be considered torture.").

169 Stinson & Stinson, On the Death of a Baby, ATLANTICJuly 1979, at 64, 65; see R. STINSON
& P. STINSON, THE LONG DYING OF BABY ANDREW (1983).
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proper decisionmaking. This is so because the ultimate question is one
of helping the patient, providing not merely survival in whatever inhuman condition but some genuine net benefit for the person. To determine
if a net benefit accrues, all benefits to and all burdens on that person
must be taken into account.
Courts across the country have supported the right of adults to
refuse medical treatment, rejecting claims that to do so might violate
norms of preserving life and preventing suicide. 70 They have done so
not merely out of respect for any person's right to do whatever he or
she wants, however strange or bizarre the choice; explicit or implicit in
almost every case is the acceptance of the soundness and legitimacy of
nontreatment decisions, when such decisions avoid the burdens of
pain, suffering and loss of humanity and dignity. Only a handful of
decisions have involved infants.'
In three cases, ' 7 2 parents of infants
in a permanently unconscious state were allowed to forego the medical
machines that would sustain their infants' lives. A New York case permitted parents of a child striken with spina bifida and related complications to forego life prolonging surgery.173
Attempts to impose medical treatment upon incompetents in other
contexts have also led courts to adopt a benefits and burdens analysis.
In Rivers v. Katz,' 74 the New York Court of Appeals deemed the balancing of benefits and burdens necessary to the evaluation of a mentally ill
170 See, e.g., Rasmussen H, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987);John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). The NewJersey Supreme Court
observed that a balancing of factors reflects "a basic aspect of right-to-die cases." In rejobes,
108 N.J. 394, 436 n.7, 529 A.2d 434, 455 n.7 (1987).
171 The dearth of cases concerning newborns is itself significant. As Professor Clark
observes:
[N]otwithstanding the extensive publicity given to some of the cases in which treatment for newborns has been withheld, the existing legal sanctions are seldom invoked. When the cases do come to court, it is usually in the context of a proceeding
to seek court approval for the action or nonaction which the parents and perhaps the
physicians wish to adopt. One must conclude from this that the state officials responsible for civil or criminal proceedings recognize that the parents' decision to withhold treatment is morally justified in some circumstances, a recognition which is
shared by at least some commentators. If the treatment involves intrusive, painful or
very uncomfortable procedures for the child without countervailing benefits, or substantial risk of death or a further impairment of physical or mental capacity, the parental refusal to authorize it seems justified.
H. CLARK, supra note 103, at 588 (citations omitted).
172 In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); In re L.H.R.,
253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984); In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982).
173 Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, aff d on other grounds
60 N.Y.2d 208 (1983). The Court of Appeals, in affirming on other grounds, did term the
treatment course "responsibly decided upon" by the parents. Wlleber, 60 N.Y.2d at 210.
174 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986).
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patient's state constitutional liberty interest in refusing medical treatment. The opinion gave these directions to lower courts:
If... the court concludes that the patient lacks the capacity to
determine the course of his own treatment, the court must determine whether the proposed treatment is narrowly tailored
to give substantive effect to the patient's liberty interest, taking
into consideration all relevant circumstances, including the patient's best interests, the benefits to be gained from the. treatment, the adverse side effects associated with the treatment
75
and any less intrusive alternative treatments.'
As in the law, the balancing of benefits and burdens is an integral
part of medical practice. Here the balance must be struck between the
honored principles of prolonging life and of doing no harm (primum non
nocere, in the Hippocratic Oath) by prolonging suffering:

There are times when the principle goals of medicine - prolonging life and relieving suffering - come into conflict. The
statutes do not recognize the reality or the moral relevance of
suffering in neonatal medicine. Physicians should not be required to prolong life by all available means and in disregard
of the agony the patient may experience. 17 6
The AMA Judicial Council has similarly declared that:
In the making of decisions for the treatment of seriously deformed newborns . . . the primary consideration should be
what is best for the individual patient .... Quality of life is a

factor to be considered in determining what is best for the individual. Life should be cherished despite disabilities and
handicaps, except when the prolongation would be inhumane
and unconscionable. Under these circumstances, withholding
or removing life supporting means is ethical....
75

1

Id. at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.

176Feldman & Murray, State Legislation and the Handicapped Newborn: A Mforal and Political
Dilemma, 12 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 156, 162 (1984); accordJonsen, Phibbs, Tooley & Gar-

land, Critical Issues in Newborn Intensive Care: A Conference Report and Proposal, 55 PEDIATRICS 756
(1975).
177AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL § 2.14 (1984).
Dr. A. G. M. Campbell, writing of the burdens justifying nonaggressive care, has observed:

[M]any pediatricians would probably agree that the most important medical criterion is severe abnormality, disease, or damage to the central nervous system, especially the brain, which will have devastating consequences for development ...

Specific examples include infants with hydranencephaly, severe neural tube defects,
gross hydrocephalus if complicated by infection, and chromosomal disorders such as

trisomy 13 and 18. Infants with extensive and fully documented .. .brain damage
after asphyxia and hemorrhage might also be included.
Campbell, Which Infants Should Not Receive Intensive Care?, 57 ARCH. OF Dis. IN CHILDHOOD 56971 (1982), quoted in Young, Caringfor Disabled Infants, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 15 (1983).
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Ethical norms that are widely accepted in our society also support a
benefits/burdens approach to medical decisionmaking. If a person is
not competent to make an autonomous choice, then he or she deserves
the consideration of all benefits and all burdens as part of the respect
due to persons, whatever their condition. This ethical notion has been
defined as "the obligation that each person be acknowledged as a
unique being, and dealt with in terms of his or her own desires, needs
and purposes."' 78 Coupled with the ethical principle of beneficence,
which "requires both the provision of benefit and avoidance of
harm,"' 7 9 ethical decisionmaking must encompass a balancing of benefits and burdens that takes all vital interests of the individual into account. By imposing treatment without considering the attendant
burdens, the federal infant Doe rule ignores a basic ethical duty owed
to all persons in another's care, especially children: the duty to shelter
them from harm.
The federal rule, exalting a chance at survival above all else, and
preempting the full consideration of all burdens associated with aggressive treatment for individual infants, violates critical norms of law,
medicine and ethics. As a consequence, it fails to satisfy basic constitutional principles that flow from these norms. These principles are set
forth in the following section.
VI.

GUIDELINES FOR CONSTITUTIONALLY
PERMISSIBLE RULEMAKING

I suggest that certain principles, useful in guiding constitutionally
permissible rulemaking, emerge from the analysis so far. These principles reflect the interwoven cultural and constitutional values that limit
government to a more modest (and more constructive) role in decisionmaking for infant Does.
A.

EVERY INFANT DOE DESERVES INDIVIDUAL, SENSITIVE
AND CAREFUL CONSIDERATION

Rulemakers must take into account the potentially vast application
of decisionmaking standards for newborns. Infant Does are a heterogenous population with widely differing medical conditions. For some infants, the "facts" of their ailments are imperfectly known due to the
limits of medical knowledge and the awesome variability of abnormal
birth conditions. The over 3,000 kinds of birth defects 180 defy comYoung notes that there is "substantial agreement with Campbell's position on this issue, not
only in Britain and in Sweden, but here in the United States as well." Young, supra, at 16.
178 RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN, supra note 152, at 135.
79

1 Id. at 123.
180 MARCH OF DIMES BIRTH DEFECTS FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1986).
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plete understanding. When identified, medical conditions vary from individual to individual in their severity, in their course of development
over time, and in their debilitating effect upon the patient. 8 ' Changing conditions make decisionmaking for a newborn a continuous rather
than a one-time task.18 2 The common presence of multiple defects and
diseases renders each infant's condition unique and not subject to easy
categorization. One parent's experience dramatically illustrates this:
"[w]hen the baby finally died, three months after her birth, the hospital
asked if they could perform an autopsy and we consented. The list of
abnormalitiesfilled both sides of an 8 1/2-by-II inch sheet ofpaper, single spaced.
I looked at it and wept....3

The federal infant Doe law attempts to divide up this complex reality into a handful of decisionmaking categories. The attempt fails because, as the Supreme Court once observed in another context, "[t]he
versatility of circumstances often mocks a natural desire for definitive''
ness.""4
Simplistic legal categories cannot address the complexity of
these problems, nor will they promote the separate, detailed and distinct consideration of treatment and nontreatment alternatives that is
every infant's due.
B.

RULES MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WIDELY SHARED SOCIETAL
RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE USE OF NON-CURATIVE
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY

The current federal law, by reducing a sensitive, multifaceted problem to a one-dimensional medical inquiry "solves" ethical dilemmas of
care by ignoring them (or by implicitly presuming that the right-to-life
ethic is so morally superior that all other ethical concerns must be
swept aside). But questions about the humaneness of treatment, the
preservation of basic human dignity and the disproportionality of benefits and burdens must be addressed, in order to give the individual's
fundamental liberty interests their appropriate scope. To do so implies
no rejection of the sanctity of life ideal in our society, but rather recognizes that the sanctity of life principle finds its limit in precisely the area
addressed by the infant Doe statute.
181See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 29, at 202 (spina bifida "causes physical

and/or mental impairments that range widely in severity and frequently involve many organ
systems.") Doctors at the Stanford University School of Medicine argue that the complexity
and uncertainty of diagnosis and prognosis for the premature infant makes the federal standard an unworkable one for all infants whose conditions are not easily categorized. Stevenson, Ariagno, Kutner, Raffin & Young, supra note 43, at 1909.
182 See, e.g., F. FROHOCK, supra note 155 (discussing accounts of infant care).
183 The Parents Doe, NATION, Feb. 25, 1984, at 213 (emphasis added)(parent author requested anonymity).
184Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 352 (1958).
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In the context of critical illness, when restoration of health is impossible or improbable, other values compete with treatment imperatives. We recognize as reasonable the desire of people to avoid the
"living death" of an existence maintained solely by medical machines.
Pain and suffering are sometimes too extreme a price to pay for the
continuation of life; turning down "heroic" attempts to preserve life is
an accepted notion in our culture. To insist on maximal treatment in
extreme circumstances converts the sanctity of life notion into a requirement of martyrdom. Treatment to ensure survival in extreme
states of incapacitation and suffering contradicts medical notions of humaneness in treatment and undermines essential moral qualities of empathy, mercy and compassion. Compelling painful and burdensome
treatment, even when survival is doubtful, reflects a severe ideology
that the State, justified only in promoting children's best interests, cannot impose.
C.

RULES MUST DELEGATE DISCRETION; THEY CANNOT
SPECIFICALLY COVER ALL SITUATIONS IN WHICH
TREATMENT DILEMMAS ARISE

If, as argued here, the relatively simple premise of the federal rule,
that virtually any chance at survival mandates aggressive treatment, violates state constitutional standards, lawmakers will have to confront the
true complexity of medical decisionmaking for infant Does. In so doing, they will find that the problem of treatment choice simply does not
lend itself to precise rulemaking. Rather, it resembles the kind of problem that the law deals with by general directives, for example, to consider "the totality of the circumstances" and do what is "in the best
interests" of a child or other person, with further elaboration coming
over time as societal consensus forms around certain norms. This approach seems indicated when, as here, a problem's individual manifestations vary so much from one another, a multiplicity of factors bear
upon the decision in any particular case and assigning exact mathematical weights to the relevant factors is impossible.
The reference to "reasonable medical judgment" in the statute
may seem like a concession to the need for discretion, but it is not.
Reasonable medical judgment normally takes account of the risks and
burdens of treating, in addition to the potential benefits.' 8 5 Because
the statute does not permit these decisional elements to be carefully
weighed and balanced, it in fact abrogates physician discretion.
185 Kopelman, Irons & Kopelman, supra note 27, at 682-83; Stevenson, Ariagno, Kutner,
Raffin & Young, supra note 43, at 1911.
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ROLE OF PARENTS

For the government to displace parents as decisionmaker, under
the rubric of child abuse and neglect or otherwise, it must appear that
parents have failed in their constitutionally recognized role as primary
caretakers of the child. At the extremes, failure is easily identified and
parental decisions properly superseded. In the "gray" areas, where
doubts about what is right and wise persist and agonizing choices must
be made, deference to family decisionmaking is our cultural and constitutional heritage. Even the HHS acknowledged in its interpretive
guidelines to the federal law that "parents are the decisionmakers concerning treatment for their disabled infant." 1 86 But the law and the
HHS guidelines go on to exclude parents from virtually all medical
decisionmaking for their child.
VII.

RULEMAKING TASKS

These general principles allow some room for choice in policymaking, while recognizing that important limits on the power of judicial
and legislative rulemakers flow from state constitutional and common
law commitments to the liberty of individuals, the rights of incompetents and the privacy of the family. The choices open to lawmakers,
and the restraints on them, will be discussed in the context of three key
rulemaking tasks:
(1) identifying the proper range of decision in which parents can exercise their own best judgment;
(2) identifying the factors that are relevant and those that are not relevant to decisionmaking; and
(3) identifying what procedures, if any, may be imposed on the decisionmaking process.
TASK 1:

IDENTIFYING THE RANGE OF PARENTAL DECISION

In identifying the range of decision for parents, it is readily apparent that there are extreme cases for which decisions, however tragic,
are uncontroversial. Anencephalic infants (born with large portions of
their brain tissue absent) are not able to survive.' 8 7 Infants with other
fatal, incurable problems and very brief life expectancies pose no dilemmas of care. Neither do infants on the other side of the spectrum,
those who are ill but readily curable, or restorable to health although
suffering from a mild degree of mental retardation. Parental discretion
18650 Fed. Reg. 14,880 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1985).
187 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 29, at 181.
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to deny life sustaining medical help need not be so broad as to encompass every infant with a medical problem.
The key question is how far in from these extremes can and should
rulemaking lines be drawn. A number of statements in the medical,
ethical and legal literature offer helpful guidance on the matter. The
statements, it should be noted, were not necessarily intended as legal
standards, but they are helpful in formulating legal standards. Consider in this light the following:
1. [H]andicaps justify a decision not to provide life-sustaining treatment only when they are so severe that continued existence would
not be a net benefit to the infant .... [N]et benefit is absent only if
the burdens imposed on the patient by the disability or its treatment would lead a competent decisionmaker to choose to forego
the treatment.18 8
2. If the treatment involves intrusive, painful or very uncomfortable
procedures for the child without countervailing benefits, or substantial risk of death or a further impairment of physical or mental
capacity, the parental refusal to authorize it seems justified. 189
3. [The issue is whether a parent's decision refusing a medical procedure is a] reasonable one based on due consideration of the medical options available and on a genuine concern for the best
interests of the child. 9 0
4. In the making of decisions for the treatment of seriously deformed
newborns or persons who are severely deteriorated victims of injury, illness or advanced age, the primary consideration should be
what is best for the individual patient and not the avoidance of a
burden to the family or to society. Quality of life is a factor to be
considered in determining what is best for the individual. Life
should be cherished despite disabilities and handicaps, except
when the prolongation would be inhumane and unconscionable.
Under these circumstances, withholding or removing life support
means is ethical provided that the normal care given an individual
who is ill is not discontinued.' 9 '
5. The social commitment of the physician is to sustain life and relieve
suffering. Where the performance of one duty conflicts with the
other, the choice of the patient, or his family or legal representative
if the patient is incompetent to act in his own behalf, should prevail. In the absence of the patient's choice or an authorized proxy,
1881d. at 218-19.
189 H. CLARK, supra note 103, at 588 (citations omitted).
190 United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 1984)(quoting district
court opinion).
191AMERICAN MED. Ass'N, supra note 177, at § 2.14.

48

6.

7.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE

VOL. XV NO. 1

the physician must act in the best interest of the patient.1 92
The Vatican's position ...states that the physician may also judge
that the technique imposes on the patient strain or suffering which
93
is out of proportion to the benefit to be gained. 1
[Treatment should be required only] if the medical profession
agrees on a proper course of treatment, and if treatment will enable
the child to make progress in growth and development, and if the
94
failure to treat would result in the child's death.1

8.

There are instances when guardians, fulfilling their duty to act beneficially for their wards, may decide that the treatment would inflict
too great a burden on the patient. A guardian has a special duty to
benefit his ward. It would be illogical to allow guardians to refuse
treatment for themselves because of the gravity of the burden, and
yet never allow them to refuse treatment for their wards; guardians
have a stricter duty to benefit, and therefore reduce burdens to,
their wards than they do to themselves. Therefore, grave burden
must be a legitimate criterion for guardians to refuse treatment on
behalf of their wards as long as the burden may reasonably be considered gravely burdensome.195
9. If the patient's views are unknown the.., guardian should be given
some discretion in deciding what is in the best interest of the patient. Such guardians should be able to choose from among the
reasonable available treatment choices and should not be constrained to choose the most objectively attractive option. The decision must be a reasonable one, but we should not insist upon the
single most reasonable one.... A decision would not be unreason96
able because it lacked popular approval.1
These statements generally support a standard (of net benefit, grave
burden, reasonableness, competent decisionmaking) that allows the
many factors'97 in these complex situations to come into play.
The President's Commission endorsed parental decisionmaking in
ambiguous cases and approved of treatment refusal if a "competent
decisionmaker" would agree.' 9 8 A competent decisionmaker might be
considered to be one who adopted some reasonable point of view. This
192 Statement of Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the A.M.A., Withholding or
Withdrawing Life Prolonging Medical Treatment (1986).
193Paris, supra note 122, at 124 (describing the Vatican's 1980 Declaration on Euthanasia).
194Shatten & Chabon, Decision laking and the Right to Refuse Lifesaving Treatment for Defective
Newborns, 3J. LEGAL MED. 59, 74 (1982).
195Veatch, Limits of Guardian Treatment Refusal. .4 Reasonableness Standard, 9 Am.J.L. &
MED. 427, 435-36.

196 Id.at 442, 466.
197See infra text accompanying notes 204-19.
198PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 29, at 218-19.
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is not necessarily a majority view but one, of perhaps several choices,
that is supported by good reasoning. We know that reasonable, competent decisionmakers consider benefits and burdens, and make some
tradeoffs between quality of life and longevity.199 They contemplate
such matters as shortness of life expectancy with and without treatment, degree of pain and suffering, severity of incapacitating impairments, developmental potential, future dependence on machines and
life-restricting technologies and awareness of and ability to interact
with others. They do not always seek maximal care.
The constitutional soundness of the kind of broad approach articulated in these statements is clear. The elements of concern to the individual infant are allowed serious attention. Discretion, essential to the
ability to tailor responses to individual needs in a complex and at times
rapidly changing factual context, is preserved. Diverse (but not aberrational) moral and ethical values, characteristic of a free society, find expression. Parents and their advisers have the space provided by a
broad standard to discuss, ponder, seek wisdom and gather strength.
The broad approach has another critical advantage. In a controversial area, when ideas and ideals need to be discussed and debated,
broad rules permit room for the evolution of societal conceptions
about ethics, moral values and law. Premature legal answers to difficult
social questions can inhibit debate when it is most needed. This may
have occurred in the infant Doe debate itself. Although there were important precursors, the principal initial impetus to widespread discussion of the issue was the national publicity given to the case of an infant
Doe born in Bloomington, Indiana.2"' Professional, academic and
public debate flourished, although public debate unfortunately centered around only a very few dramatized cases. Yet this debate seemed
to have subsided considerably after Congress enacted the federal infant
Doe law in 1984. The statute resulted not from public consensus, but
from political bargaining among organized interest groups. 2 ' The
199 See McNeil, Weichselbaum & Paulker, Speech and Survival: Tradeoffs Between Quality and
Quantity of Life in Laryngeal Cancer, 305 NEW ENG.J. MED. 982 (1981); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass.
App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978).
200 The official records in this case, universally acknowledged as a focal point in the legislative debate on the federal statute, are sealed. In re Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-004A (Ind. Ct.
App. Apr. 12, 1982), writ of mandamus dismissed sub nom. State ex rel. Infant Doe v. Baker, No.
482 § 140 (Ind. Sup. Ct. May 27, 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983). Various informal
accounts of it appear in articles and books. See, e.g., J. LYONS, supra note 43, at 21-39 ("[N]o
single event in years had so galvanized . . . reformers as the death of Baby Doe.").
As Professor Jay Katz has pointed out, legislative proposals spurred by one tragic event
"are often insufficiently considered," creating more problems than they solve. J. KATZ & A.
CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHo DECIDES WHAT? 130, 159 (1982).
201 The bargaining was among disability groups, right-to-life advocates, and medical
groups. Kerr, Aegotiating the Compromises, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1985, at 6. For an
excellent recap of the gains and losses of the organized groups and the unorganized parents,
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public debate prominently included parents; 21 2 the political bargaining
did not. The necessary public discussion may have been truncated by
the appearance of a solution, a deeply flawed one that ignored actual
interests of both families and infants.
In the case of infant Does, a continuing period of elaboration is
needed to spell out liberty and privacy ideals in a technological context
that we have not yet managed to control. The best law can do, for now,
is to design broad rules in keeping with our basic beliefs in freedom for
private decisionmaking in matters of conscience, intimacy and tragic
choice. Thus, legislatures or courts may proceed by adopting some variant of the best interest/benefits and burdens standard. This can be
elaborated upon by citing specific decisionmaking factors that validly
20
come into play.

TASK 2:

3

IDENTIFYING FACTORS RELEVANT TO DECISIONMAKING

In determining the best interests of infant Does, it is possible to
specify factors that should and those that should not play a role in decisionmaking. Factors that clearly are important include: medical diagnosis; clinical course of medical conditions since birth; length of life
expectancy; survival chances with and without treatment; expected neurological, physical and mental impairment; developmental potential;
availability of corrective treatment; extent of treatment benefits if cure
is not possible; pain and suffering associated with medical condition;
pain and suffering associated with treatment; invasiveness, stressfulness, and duration of treatment; need for repeated medical interventions; need for lengthy hospitalization or institutionalization; risks
associated with treatment; and the proven, experimental, or untested
nature of treatment. As stated earlier, only in individual circumstances
can the importance and weight of all of these factors be assessed, and
benefits and burdens properly analyzed.
It is also possible for policymakers to exclude certain factors from
consideration. The President's Commission reasonably suggests that
see Lantos, Baby Doe Five Years Later. Implicationsfor Child Health, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 444
(1987)(unorganized parents "were not a great source of concern among politicans").
202 See R. STINSON & P. STINSON, supra note 169; The Parents Doe, supra note 183, at 213.

News articles and editorials also reported parental views and concerns: Cruelty and Baby
Jane, N.Y. Times, Nov. i, 1983, (Editorial), at 26; Chambers, Advocatesfor the Right to Life, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 16, 1984, (Magazine), at 94; Big Brothers and Baby Doe, N.Y. Times,July 28, 1984,
(Editorial), at 22, col. I.; CBS Evening 'ews with Dan Rather, supra note I.
203 See infra text accompanying notes 204-14. A statutory model from another child-pro-

tective context is the Michigan child custody law. It sets forth the basic principle that custody
shall be determined according to the "best interests" of the child and lists nine particular
factors important to the ultimatejudgment on best interest. The factors listed are not exhaustive; decisionmakers are free to consider matters not listed if they bear on the child's interest.
18 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.312(3) (1984).
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"idiosyncratic" views of parents - for example, a belief that blood
transfusions are always morally unacceptable - are improper factors in
decisionmaking.2 °4 The example of religion-based refusals of proven
medical techniques seems clear. Abhorrence of technology is an unacceptable reason for treatment choice. So, for that matter, is idolization
of technology manifested by doctors who feel compelled to use technology "because it is there.". Such doctors - and the literature indicates there are a substantial number2 0 5 - are as idiosyncratic in their
views as are parents who absolutely reject blood transfusions. As long
as "idiosyncratic" is so understood, its exclusion from decisionmaking
is perfectly sound. Other interests are clearly dispensable. Doctors' interests in keeping treatment going so as to reap research benefits, to
perfect medical technologies or to help train younger doctors in neonatal care techniques2 0 6 do not commend themselves as mandatory influences on decisionmaking, even when they are motivated by a desire to
benefit future infants. Neither do doctors' interests in promoting their
own personal moral standards over those of parents (assuming parental
values are not aberrational and so beyond the proper range of decision).20 7 Institutional interests of hospitals, in their survival statistics,
research reputations, and income generation from highly priced intensive care units, similarly can be dismissed as factors in decisionmaking.
20
The interests of parents have also been suggested as dismissible 1
but with some reservations and disagreement. The suffering of parents
204 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 29, at 218.
205 See, e.g., Silverman, Mismatched Attitudes about Neonatal Death, 11 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
12 (1981); Keyserlingk, Non-Treatment in the Best Interests of the Child: A Case Commentary of Couture-Jacquet v. Montreal Children's Hospital, 32 McGILL L.J. 413, 422 (1987); Frader, Difficulties in
Providing Intensive Care, 64 PEDIATRICS 10 (1979).

As theologian John J. Paris has written:
[lit is the evolution of technology to the ultimate value that has created the problems
we see today and that has distanced us so far from the kind of wisdom every caring
grandmother in this country would know how to apply to these questions.
Paris, supra note 122, at 122.
206 Neonatal intensive care units (NICU) rely heavily on young physicians who must be
trained; training needs are "potentially at odds with the well-being of patients." J. GUILLEMIN
& L. HOLMSTROM, supra note 155, at 278. Research, status, hospital reputation and financial
returns are all concerns of NICU life likely to increase resistance to needed improvements. Id.
at 185-87. Physicians "have a long history of using the sick to learn about diseases, to transmit
Duff, supra note 158, at 318 (emphasis in orignial).
knowledge and to make a living ....
"The need for observation and data may push a clinician, even unconsciously, to extend a
course of care beyond reasonable limits of benefit to the patient." Jonsen, Phibbs, Tooley &
Garland, supra note 176, at 763.
207 Although doctors ordinarily can reject patients who ask them to act contrary to their
own morality, letting such patients seek out another doctor, this is not possible in the typical
infant Doe situation, where the infant is in the effective custody of the hospital nursery. Parents can not move very sick infants or go "doctor shopping" when infants are in intensive care
units.
208 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 29, at 211; H. CLARK, supra note 103, at 588.

52

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE

VOL. XV NO. 1

is a part of the entire tragedy of serious birth defects, and prolonging
that suffering is a harm legitimately to be avoided. Since their suffering
is directly related to the suffering of their infant, and since caring parents naturally want their child to live, this parental interest in practical
terms will not usually conflict with the infant's own interests.
Another interest of parents is the avoidance of financial burdens
and other demands on the family presented by a severely ill neonate.
Eliminating cost considerations is easy when imagining parents who do
not want to give up their vacation at the beach to pay for infant care.
But the real life cases are more difficult. Extravagantly high costs in
intensive care units can have ruinous effects on families, depriving parents and existing children of their economic security. If a state will not
itself pay these astronomical bills, should it tell a family to take the risk
of going bankrupt for a chance, perhaps slim, that an infant will survive,
but with a lifelong, incurable major impairment? When conditions of
extreme hardship exist, amid factors which make the choice for treatment problematic, there is a colorable claim that the infant's interests,
while of primary importance, need not be totally exclusive. 20 9 The
state itself makes finances a key factor in decisions that affect lives (for
example, when a legislature votes to stop funding certain expensive operations).21 0 If the state can do this, it would be anomalous to say families, in a more limited way, are barred from even thinking about costs.
A possible solution might be to permit the consideration of cost as a
factor only when the infant's chances for a reasonably intact survival are
poor. Bankrupting a family when hope is dim and success speculative
seems an unnecessary and cruel compounding of the family's ordeal.
It is sometimes said that "social factors" such as the caretaking
209 Veatch, supra note 195, at 436-37. An example given by Veatch illustrates the point:
[J]ustification for guardian treatment refusal on behalf of an incompetent patient
should focus almost exclusively on the burden to the patient; however, there are
exceptional situations where the door must be opened to consider the burdens to
others. It would be unrealistic not to recognize such exceptions.
Consider the situation of a family with moderate means consisting of husband,
wife, and three children including an infant with a severe immune deficiency. The

infant is not expected to live, but the physician advises that if the infant were flown
immediately across the country to an East Coast research facility, there would be
about one chance in one thousand that the baby would survive. The treatment

would not be painful to the child. The cost of the transportation and care would be
approximately $100,000. The family has net worth including equity in their house of
$60,000, but they could borrow the remainder. Most reasonable people would say
that the parents are under no moral obligation to borrow the money to provide the
infant this slim chance of survival; yet, if only benefit to the patient were considered,
they ought to be required to do so.
Id. at 436.
210 Egan, Rebuffed by Oregon, Patients Take Their Life-or-Death Cases to Public, N.Y. Times, May
1, 1988, at 26, col. 1 (state legislature reallocates public funds from transplant operations to
prenatal care).
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ability of the family and the nature of public and private institutions
that care for severely handicapped children should be excluded from
decisionmaking for the severely damaged infant because such factors
"potentially can be ameliorated by societal change.""' Caution is in
order, however, before dismissing such matters from the decisionmaking matrix. Often enough, home care for an infant with severe medical
problems is not a realistic possibility for the family. A fragile child may
need frequent monitoring and special equipment, require continual
help with feeding and personal care, exhibit behavioral difficulties, experience seizures or generally need close supervision every day. If a
family cannot provide home care for an incapacitated child, it may have
to resort to institutions operated by private entrepreneurs or by the
state. Parents may have no choice but to accept any placement offered,
even if they have strong doubts or reservations about its basic quality,
because of the shortages in available care.2" 2
While societal change is theoretically possible, children salvaged
by aggressive infant treatment must live in the real world where too
often only limited help to them is available, even help of the most elementary kind. In Texas, for example, a federal judge hearing a suit
brought by parents of children in a Fort Worth institution, reported by
the New York Times to be the newest and smallest of the state's thirteen
facilities for the mentally retarded,2" 3 found the state had violated the
children's constitutional rights by severely mistreating them and by
generally failing to provide minimally adequate care.
In Massachusetts, a pediatric nursing home system was established
in 1971 to provide better care for multiply handicapped children than
overcrowded state institutions had provided. Yet a 1983 study2 14 revealed that the new system was plagued by fundamental health care
deficiencies and other major problems. Most of the children were in
Rhoden, supra note 13, at 1322.
See Glick, Guyer, Burr & Gorbach, PediatricNursing Homes: Implications of the Massachusetts Experience for Residential Care of Multiply Handicapped Children, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 640,
643 (1983); see also Society for Good Will v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300, 1337 (E.D.N.Y. 1983);
Mincer, Day Carefor Sick Children, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1987, at C9, col. I (reporting opening of
nation's only nonprofit day care center for children with special needs).
213 The court's findings were sobering:
211

212

[Jiudge Sanders said today that the state had violated the constitutional rights of the
mentally retarded youths sent to state schools "by failing to provide constitutionally
adequate medical care, constitutionally adequate safety, constitutionally adequate
freedom from undue restraint, and constitutionally adequate habilitation." Judge
Sanders spelled out in harrowing detail some cases of inadequate care and neglect.
He described residents lying in their own feces and urine, cases of sexual abuse of
residents and residents being beaten by staff members.
Appelborne, Texas Held in Contempt Over Treatment of lentally Retarded, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14,
1987, at AI0, col. 1.
214 Glick, Guyer, Burr & Gorbach, supra note 212, at 642.
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dire medical condition - bedridden, nonverbal, suffering from a wide
range of chronic disorders, with prognoses of "significant impairment
of growth and development and severe limitation of independent functioning. "21 5 Of the total resident population, 79% had severe or
profound mental retardation; 72% had seizures. Most of those with
seizures also had cerebral palsy. Heriditary disorders, prenatal and
perinatal problems were the overwhelming causes of the children's
disabilities.

2 16

The study found low standards of care, insufficient funding, financing schemes that provide "little incentive ...

to upgrade care substan-

tially," shortages of residential places and bureaucratic disputes that
leave "many children in the homes [receiving] fewer services and less
individualized professional attention than do residents of other facilities." '2 17 The study also found that "if a child requires an unusually
intensive program of intervention, such as behavior modification or
special feeding, it is often impossible to find staff or funding to implement

'2 18

it.

As both the Massachusetts and Texas experiences demonstrate,
the child's future medical status, as well as his emotional and psychological health may be in considerable jeopardy after placement in these
institutions.2 1 9 Policymakers hoping to encourage aggressive treatment choices would do better to upgrade the facilities and services that
exist in their states, rather than compel parents to preside over dreadful lives for their afflicted children.
TASK 3:

IDENTIFYING PROCEDURES FOR DECISIONMAKING

Lawmakers generally enjoy considerable freedom in devising procedural rules to govern the assertion of substantive constitutional
rights. Procedures cross constitutional boundaries, however, when
they destroy or inhibit the exercise of rights by imposing unduly burdensome, cumbersome or intimidating conditions. Procedures may
also undermine rights by imposing non-neutral conditions that hamper
215 Id This is one of the criteria for placement in the system.
2 16
Id. at 643.
2 17

Id. at 644.
218 Id.

219 In the Massachusetts children's nursing homes, many children had no or few visits
from their families. Id. See Gross, Cox, Tatgrek, Pollay & Barnes, Early MXanagement and Decision Makingfor the Treatment of Myelomeningocele, 72 PEDIATRIcs 450 (1983); Shaw, QL Revisited,
18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 10 (1988)(societal resources affect medical outcomes). For cases in

which parents challenged conditions in institutions, see Society for Good Will v. Cuomo, 572
F. Supp. 1300 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), and cases cited in Note, Parental Rights and the HabilitationDecision for ;Ventally Retarded Children, 94 YALE L.J. 1715, 1737 n.120 (1985). The nation's poor
standard of care for the mentally retarded is recounted in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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individuals who seek to act on their rights. 22 ° In the context of medical
decisionmaking for incompetent individuals, the two procedural mechanisms most frequently discussed are the establishment of special hospital committees and the use of the courts to help resolve infant Doe
dilemmas. These will be addressed in turn, followed by a discussion of
the use of other procedures.
1. Committees
The federal government encourages but does not mandate the use
of hospital committees to participate in decisionmaking. 22 ' The HHS,
in its single-minded effort to eliminate ethics from infant Doe decisionmaking, refrains from including ethicists on its list of recommended
"core members" or "other permanent members" of such committees. 2 2 Much of the scholarly literature, however, describes these entities as "ethics committees," recognizing the central role that ethical
223
deliberation must have in true dilemmas of care.
Committees are a mixed blessing in infant Doe scenarios. They
may contribute positively by providing a forum for full discussion of the
medical, ethical and social ramifications of the various treatment options available, by supplying additional medical expertise to confirm
the diagnosis and prognosis of the attending physician, and by defusing
emotional conflicts and fostering better communication between parents and physicians. They can help persuade those involved to abandon irrational positions and give support to realistic appraisal and
thoughtful deliberation. Unfortunately, these advantages may not always be realized in practice. Committees do not always work effectively
(hence the standard joke that a mule is a horse designed by a committee). Committees striving for consensus may reach compromises not
wholly satisfactory to anyone but which preserve the aura of group
agreement. Committees also tend to shift the burden of responsibility
for a decision from each member to the amorphous group. Physicians
on these committees may simply reinforce each other's professional bi220 The abortion context offers many examples of non-neutral conditions and burdensome procedures. See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1983)(ordinance struck down). For a discussion of the chilling effect of procedures in the
area of treatment refusals, see In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114,660 P.2d 738 (1983); In rejobes,
108 N.J. 394, 423, 529 A.2d 434, 449 (1987).
221 See HHS, Model Guidelines for Health Care Providers to Establish Infant Care Review
Committees, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,893 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1985).
222 Id. at 14,894, 14,897.
223 For more detailed discussion, see Levine, Questions and (Some Very Tentative) Answers
About Hospital Ethics Committees, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1984, at 9; Veatch, The Ethics of
Institutional Ethics Committees, in INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMirrEES AND HEALTH CARE DEC[SIONMAKING (1984); McCormack, Ethics Committees: Promise or Peril?, 12 LAw MED. & HEALTH
CARE 150 (1984).
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ases and tendencies toward aggressive treatment. Hospital administrators on a committee may be influenced, consciously or not, by
institutional concerns about legal liability, public image, preservation
of government/hospital relations and hospital finances. The committee may be well run or poorly run. Its members may be dedicated and
hard working or casual and uninvolved. It may be dominated by one or
two individuals or enjoy the active participation of all members. Many
proponents of these committees suggest that they should be consultative and advisory, not final decisionmakers. 22 4 If committees are more
than advisory and actually make treatment decisions for newborns, serious problems arise. The committee itself is not authorized to practice
medicine and should not be in the position of making final medical
treatment choices. Moreover, if parental decisionmaking authority is,
as argued previously, a constitutionally-based right, it may not be displaced by a committee. Of course, the committee may advise the hospital to challenge a parental decision in court. Responsibility and
accountability for the well-being of children ultimately rest with their
parents, not with private committees, however well chosen and
intentioned.2 2 5
2.

Courts

While court involvement in all cases of withdrawal or withholding
of life sustaining treatment is a theoretical possibility, policy makers are
well advised not to impose any such requirement. The courts themselves have rejected routine involvement in cases involving treatment
choices for critically ill family members. In the Quinlan case, 226 the New
Jersey Supreme Court found that the "practice of applying to a court to
confirm such decisions would generally be inappropriate, not only because that would be a gratuitous encroachment upon the medical profession's field of competence, but because it would be impossibly
cumbersome.- 2 2 7 The New York Court of Appeals in Weber v. Stony
Brook Hospital2 2 8 noted its distress with the fact that parents had
"responsibly" decided on a conservative course of treatment for their
infant daughter (rejecting surgery for spina bifida accompanied by serious complications), yet had been "subjected ... to litigation through all
three levels of our State's court system" and "force[d] .

.

. to incur the

not inconsiderable expenses of extended litigation. "229
224 See, e.g., Fost, Baby Doe: Problems and Solutions, 1984 ARIz. ST. L.J. 637.
225 For further discussion of ethics committees, see Newman, supra note 96, at 80-81; R.
WEIR, supra note 149, at 263-66.

226 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
at 50,.355 A.2d at 669.
228 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E:2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983).
229
Id. at 213, 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
227 Id.
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Litigation brings considerable stress and trauma to parents already
under the greatest strain. The publicity these cases generate causes
loss of personal privacy and sensationally displays the parents' grief
and anguish. The time needed to acquaint lawyers and judges with the
facts, which do not remain static and may change daily or hourly, renders litigation even more ill-suited to the treatment decisionmaking
task. Moreover, burdens of going to court may have a chilling effect on
230
parents desiring to forego aggressive medical care.
Two courts considering the withdrawal of life support from hopelessly ill infants deferred to the decision made by the parents, properly
recognizing the limited role a court could play in these matters. In one
of the cases, In re Guardianshipof Barry,231 a Florida appeals court wrote:
In the case of a child who has not reached maturity, it is the
parents and their medical advisors who generally must make
these decisions. And, where judicial intervention becomes
necessary or desirable, the court must be guided primarily by
the judgment of the parents who are responsible for their
child's well-being, provided, of course, that their judgment is
supported by competent medical evidence. 2
The court went on to hold that judicial review was not required before
life support could be withheld from a child who is not brain dead, recognizing "that decisions of this character have traditionally been made
within the privacy of the family relationship based on competent medical advice and consultation by the family with their religious advisors, if
that be their persuasion.-

2 33

The Georgia Supreme Court in a similar case, In re L.H.R., 2 34 also
held that parents were the final decisionmakers for their infants. While
both courts confined their holdings to the cases before them - that of
hopelessly vegetative infants - their reasoning extends to other infant
Does as well. Deference to parents, except in extreme cases, is constitutionally required, and in any event, courts have little basis for substituting their own judgment for that of responsible parents. As I have
previously written about treatment choices by the family on behalf of
one of its members:
For those instances in which stopping treatment is not beyond
the bounds of society's widely shared sense of morality, judges
can not claim any particular competence to make treat2 30

See In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983);John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
23145 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
232 Id. at 371.
233 Id.
234 253 Ga. 439, 446, 321 S.E.2d 716, 723 (1984).
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ment/nontreatment decisions for others. Such decisions require a moral, philosophical, or religious set of values; without
these it is impossible to determine whether the benefits of
treatment outweigh the burdens. Government officials, including judges, should not be selecting among competing, acceptable moral philosophies. Moral diversity ... exists in the
society at large. The government, in a free society, ought to
2 35
respect that diversity.
Courts, of course, should always be available to resolve allegations concerning parental abuse of their decisionmaking authority; such cases
would be the exception rather than the rule, however.
3.

Other Procedures

Judges or legislatures may be tempted to select procedures from
the legal armamentarium of due process and apply them to infant treatment decisions. While the appeal of due process is understandable,
policymakers must exercise self-restraint. Procedures do not render
any less perplexing difficult substantive legal and ethical conundrums,
and the unintended burdens and consequences of legal strictures can
be detrimental to those on whose behalf they are imposed and to
society.
The legal profession's overuse of procedure parallels the medical
profession's tendency to overtreat. As Dr. Alan Stone points out, legal
rules concerning medical
treatment choices are sometimes
"juridicogenic" in that they produce new, law-created problems and ill
effects.2 3 6 One of the unwanted side effects of legal process rules that
he identifies is the loss of privacy and confidentiality, ironic in the context of substantive rules which try to protect these same values. Another is the damage done when patient-oriented medical care becomes
lawyer-oriented.23 7 Procedures designed to formalize the decisionmaking process may be seen by the medical profession as a message about
235

Newman, supra note 96, at 76.

236 StoneJudges as Medical Decision Mlakers." Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease?, 33 CLEV. ST.
L. REv. 579 (1984-85).
237 Dr. Stone writes:
When doctors see the threatening shadows of the law, they forget that they are doc-

tors with personal responsibility; they act to minimize their own risks; they often call
in their lawyers and do what they are told; they often behave very much like bureaucrats. Indeed there is a high correlation between the increasing judicial and legislative intervention in medicine and the increasing bureaucratization of medical care.
For every legal intervention another committee is created. Thus, by casting what
seem like threatening shadows, the courts have influence far beyond their actual decisions on medical practice. Juridicogenic cures contribute to the bureaucratization
of medical care.
Id. at 583.
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preferred outcomes. If decisions to treat aggressively are unburdened
by formal rules of proceeding, while decisions not to treat are so encumbered, the message conveyed is that treatment is always safe and
nontreatment is a legal headache. Aggressive treatment is thereby promoted as a preferred outcome.
As an abstract matter, a "tilt" in the law favoring life-sustaining
treatment may be appealing. But policymakers must examine the real
world of medicine. If, as so often seems the case, the tendency to treat
too aggressively already predominates, 238 a further legal push in that
direction will do more harm than good. To help right the imbalance
caused by professional dominance in the medical setting, lawmakers
might do better to consider a "tilt" toward parental decisionmaking,
for example, by requiring clear and convincing evidence before paren2 39
tal choices are overridden.
Whatever the procedural proposals, lawmakers must give them
careful scrutiny, reacting reflectively rather than reflexively. Procedure,
like technology, should not be used simply because it is there.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The wide variety of diseases and incapacitating conditions that afflict newborns pose profound treatment dilemmas for their caretakers.
In the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Congress offered its solution
to these dilemmas by defining when the "withholding of medically indicated treatment" would be unlawful. In less than 200 words, the act
purported to resolve all treatment dilemmas for all infants facing every
kind of life-threatening disorder. Its rigid provisions, heavily oriented
toward aggressive medical interventions, disregard the ethical complexities associated with treatments that offer no substantial hope of
cure but impose significant burdens of pain, extended suffering, and
risk of further harm. It would perpetuate extreme states of mental and
physical devastation, ignore all reservations about the aggressive use of
medical technology and routinely deprive parents of discretion to make
informed, conscientious decisions for their own children.
States need not accept this federal standard. But most have done
so, often through agencies who stand to gain from the limited federal
funding that is contingent upon state adoption of the infant Doe rule. I
suggest that state and local child abuse agencies do not have the authority to detemine their state's law concerning compulsory treatment
for infant Does, because of their limited statutory jurisdiction and be2 38

See supra note 158.
239 On physician dominance of parents, see Malone,
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cause the issue is one that must initially be addressed by lawmakers, not
law administrators.
State constitutions, little discussed in the debate so far, may prevent legislatures from adopting the federal infant Doe rule. Infants
have a right, stemming from state constitutional commitments to the
liberty, privacy and dignity of all individuals, to have the suffering, risks
and perils of aggressive medical treatments balanced against the
hoped-for benefits of those treatments. Their parents, whom law and
society have long recognized as the proper decisionmakers for children,
should make these agonizing decision in the first instance. The government must defer to parents' well-considered choices, interceding not
routinely, but only when parental decisions are clearly unreasonable.
In the face of a new and incomplete medical technology that does
not offer easy choices, the most the law can do is to provide support
and guidance for decisionmaking that is informed, sensitive and compassionate. Perhaps most important of all, state legislators that are
truly concerned about the welfare of children should not let compulsory treatment proposals of dubious worth deflect attention away from
the need to intensify the effort to prevent birth defects and to provide
necessary services to help those who survive with them.

